



Oracle Security for DBAs and Developers




Unsafe Harbor

- This room is an unsafe harbor
- You can rely on the information in this presentation to help you protect your data, your databases, your organization, and your career
- No one from Oracle has previewed this presentation
- No one from Oracle knows what I'm going to say
- No one from Oracle has supplied any of my materials
- Everything we will discuss is existing, proven, functionality





Introduction




Daniel Morgan



- 🏆 Oracle ACE Director Alumni
 - Oracle Educator
 - 🏛️ Curriculum author and primary program instructor at University of Washington
 - 🏛️ Consultant: Harvard University
 - University Guest Lecturers
 - APAC: University of Canterbury (NZ)
 - EMEA: University of Oslo (Norway)
 - Latin America: Universidad Cenfotec, Universidad Latina de Panama, Technologico de Costa Rica
 - IT Professional
 - First computer: IBM 360/40 in 1969: Fortran IV
 - Oracle Database since 1988-9 and Oracle Beta tester
 - The Morgan behind www.morganslibrary.org
 - Member Oracle Data Integration Solutions Partner Advisory Council
 - Vice President Twin Cities Oracle Users Group (Minneapolis-St. Paul)
 - Co-Founder International GoldenGate Oracle Users Group
 - Principal Adviser: Sirius **Meta7**



System/370-145 system console



Morgan's Library

Search

www library

International Oracle Events 2016-2017 Calendar

Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct

The Library

The library is a spam-free on-line resource with code demos for DBAs and Developers. If you would like to see new Oracle database functionality added to the library ... just email us. Oracle Database 12cR2 is now available in the Cloud. If you are not already working in a 12cR1 CDB database ... you are late to the party and you are losing your competitive edge.

Home


Resources

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General

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Presentations Map



Mad Dog Morgan




Training Events and Travels

- OTN APAC, Sydney, Australia - Oct 31
- OTN APAC, Gold Coast, Australia - Nov 02
- OTN APAC, Beijing China - Nov 04-05
- OTN APAC, Shanghai China - Nov 06
- Sangam16, Bangalore, India - Nov 11-12
- NYOUG, New York City - Dec 07


Next Event: Indiana Oracle Users Group

Oracle Events




Click on the map to find an event near you

Morgan





aboard USA-71



Library News


- Morgan's Blog
- Morgan's Oracle Podcast
- US Govt. Mil. STIGs (Security Checklists)
- Bryn Llewellyn's PL/SQL White Paper
- Bryn Llewellyn's Editioning White Paper
- Explain Plan White Paper



ACE News

Would you like to become an Oracle ACE?

Learn more about becoming an ACE



- ACE Directory
- ACE Google Map
- ACE Program
- Stanley's Blog

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ForbesBrandVoice® [What is this?](#)

JAN 15, 2018 @ 05:00 AM 20,020 👁

3 Essential DBA Career Priorities For 2018



OracleVoice

Simplify IT, Drive Innovation [FULL BIO](#) ▾



Jeff Erickson, Oracle

Many database administrators (DBAs) will go into 2018 wondering if “self-driving” databases will weaken their career prospects. More likely, 2018 will be a year that database technology leaps forward and these valuable data experts take on other, more important responsibilities.

“History is repeating itself,” says longtime DBA Dan Morgan, founder of [Morgan’s Library](#) and principal adviser at tech firm Meta7. Morgan has seen the DBA role evolve amid a long series of technical advances in storage, management, and performance. And each advance asked DBAs to adjust the way they work.



Meta7 In Oracle Magazine



Oracle Magazine
July – August 2017

Features
Departments
Technology & Comment Sections—
Articles and Columns

FEATURES

Great Integrations

By David Baum

Cloud-based integration reduces complexity and connects the enterprise.

Analytics for Business

By David Baum

Organizations look to the cloud to make mission-critical decisions.

Go Big, Go Metal

By Linda Currey Post

Falconry chooses Oracle Bare Metal Cloud Services to support its pattern-recognition software.

Lessons Learned

By Jeff Erickson

Meta7 shares three top tips for moving to the cloud.

FEATURE

Lessons Learned

By Jeff Erickson

As Published In
ORACLE
MAGAZINE
July/August 2017

Meta7 shares three top tips for moving to the cloud.

Meta7 knows firsthand how cloud computing is changing organizations and careers. Persistent requests from clients prompted the firm, an Oracle Platinum Partner, to purchase more than US\$1.3 million worth of Oracle platform and infrastructure services to deepen its own expertise in helping customers procure and implement Oracle Cloud solutions.

Since then, the company has migrated some of its own business processes to the cloud and built many models and demos based on scenarios at clients of various sizes. “We’ve worked to understand everything from how a third-party on-premises application leverages Oracle Database Cloud to what’s involved in a complete lift-and-shift of Oracle E-Business Suite to Oracle Cloud,” says Paul Zajdel, vice president at Meta7, a division of Forsythe Technology that is dedicated to the Oracle stack.

What the Meta7 team learned goes well beyond cloud service features and functions. Team members have stretched their skills with new technologies and have taken on new roles to accommodate cloud services in application architectures.

That kind of change is nothing new for Meta7 and Forsythe, which began in the early 1970s as a technology hardware leasing company. “We’ve reinvented ourselves several times throughout our 45-year existence,” says Zajdel. It started with leasing, then reselling, then adding services, then adding security, and now adding managed services. He adds, “We’re in an industry that shifts. Each time the industry shifts, we have to shift, too.”

“All the deep-dive tuning and performance work, all the spinning up instances, the time it takes to understand how the new release handles things and explain how it’s different— that’s high-value, time-consuming work that DBAs don’t have to do when the database is in the cloud.”

– Paul Zajdel,
Vice President, Meta7



Meta7 is a Division of Sirius



- Sirius acquired Forsythe Nov 1, 2017
- Combined we are a \$3.5B consultancy and VAR
- World's largest IBM integrator
- Second largest security integrator in North America
- Our focus areas
 - Silicon up through Data Integration
 - Stability
 - Security
 - Scalability



Travel Log: 2010 - Chile



Introduction to Security



Why Am I Focusing On Oracle Database Security?

- Because OEM's, like Oracle, talk about their products about not security
- Because most organizations spend/waste their money on perimeter defense
- Because no one teaches operational security to
 - Application Admins
 - Network Admins
 - Storage Admins
 - System Admins
 - DBAs
 - Developers
 - IT Management
- Because most of what is implemented can be by-passed within minutes
- ... which is obvious given the number of systems broken into every day
- And in case you haven't noticed ... we, as a country, are under attack!



Security Training

- Show of hands please

1. Has your current employer provided you with a Oracle Databases security training?
2. Has your current employer paid for you to take formal security training?
3. Does your current employer have a document that states security criteria that must be followed for your organization's Oracle databases?
4. If so: Is it followed?
5. And has anyone ever lost their job for violating it?
6. Has any employer in your entire career provided you with training or a formally published security document specific to Oracle databases?
7. Is the total extent of your personal on-the-job security training someone telling you not to open emails from Nigerian royalty offering you millions of dollars?
8. Have you ever heard of any training where an employer could send you to receive training on how to secure an Oracle Database?

No, No, No, No, No, No, Yes, No



The 99:01 Rule

- Forget the 80:20 rule
- 99% of the efforts of the organizations we work for focus on passing audits
- 99% of the money spent on security focuses on
 - Compliance with government and industry regulations
 - Meeting contractually agreed-to terms
 - Auditing which is NOT security and is essentially irrelevant to security



Office of the
Privacy Commissioner
of Canada



- Everyone in this room can name dozens of organizations broken into recently

Office of Personnel Management

Equifax

Experian

Uber

Yahoo

Sony

Verizon

Deep Root Analytics

SWIFT

Intercontinental Hotels

- Every one of them ... EVERY ONE ... passed their audits



From A Security Standpoint This Is All Irrelevant Distraction



AMERICAS

- SarbOx
- HIPAA
- PCI
- FDA CFR 21 Part 11
- OMB Circular A-123
- SEC and DoD Records Retention
- DFARS
- USA Patriot Act
- Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
- Federal Sentencing Guidelines
- Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
- Market Instruments 52 (Canada)

EMEA

- EU Privacy Directives
- UK Companies Law

APAC

- J-SOX (Japan)
- CLERP 9: Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act (Australia)
- Stock Exchange of Thailand Code on Corporate Governance

GLOBAL

- International Accounting Standards
- Basel II (Global Banking)
- OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance

Misdirected By The Web

- What does the IC3 have to do with securing data?
- Nothing!
- All of this is focused on how cyber-criminals get login credentials
- Not one byte relates to how, once credentials are stolen, the data can be protected

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Internet Crime Complaint Center(IC3)

Home File a Complaint Press Room About IC3 Lost Password

2015 Press Releases

- [Hacktivists Threaten to Target Law Enforcement Personnel and Public Officials](#)
Wed, 18 Nov 2015
- [New Microchip-Enabled Credit Cards May Still Be Vulnerable to Exploitation by Fraudsters](#)
Tue, 13 Oct 2015
- [Internet of Things Poses Opportunities for Cyber Crime](#)
Thu, 10 Sep 2015
- [Business Email Compromise](#)
Thu, 27 Aug 2015
- [E-mail Account Compromise](#)
Thu, 27 Aug 2015
- [E-mail Extortion Campaigns Threatening Distributed Denial of Service Attacks](#)
Fri, 31 Jul 2015
- [Criminals Continue to Defraud and Extort Funds from Victims Using CryptoWall Ransomware Schemes](#)
Tue, 23 Jun 2015

Press Releases

Current


[2015](#)
[2014](#)
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[2011](#)
[2010](#)
[2009](#)
[2008](#)
[2007](#)
[2006](#)
[2005](#)
[2004](#)
[2003](#)

Annual Reports

- [Business E-mail Compromise](#)
Thu, 22 Jan 2015
- [University Employee Payroll Scam](#)
Tue, 13 Jan 2015
- [Scam Targeting University Students](#)
Tue, 13 Jan 2015

Misdirected By Our Vendors

- A great tool for selling Data Masking, Data Redaction, and Advanced Security Option licenses
- Not so great at doing what its title says it does

☆  **Oracle Database Security Assessment Tool (DBSAT) (Doc ID 2138254.1)** To Bottom

PURPOSE

Overview of the Oracle Database Security Assessment Tool (DBSAT)

The Oracle Database Security Assessment Tool (DBSAT) 2.0.1 is a command line tool focused on identifying how securely the database is configured, who are the users and what are their entitlements, what security policies and controls are in place, and where sensitive data resides with the goal of promoting successful approaches to mitigate potential security risks.

DBSAT has three components: Collector, Reporter, and Discoverer. Collector and Reporter work together to discover risk areas and produce reports on those risk areas - *Database Security Assessment report*. The Discoverer is a stand-alone module used to locate and report on sensitive data - *Database Sensitive Data Assessment report*.

The Collector is responsible to collect raw data from the target database by executing SQL queries and OS commands. The Reporter reads the collected data, analyzes it and produces reports with the findings. The Reporter outputs four reports in HTML, XLS, JSON and Text formats. The Discoverer executes SQL queries against database dictionary views to discover sensitive data, and outputs reports in HTML and CSV formats.

For more information about DBSAT, please see the documentation below.

DOWNLOAD




Download the Oracle Database Security Assessment Tool (DBSAT)

NOTE: You must read and click the I AGREE link below in order to download the tool.

Was this document helpful?

Yes
 No

Document Details

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Last Update: 26-Feb-2018

Related Products

Oracle Database - Enterprise Edition
Database Security Assessment Tool
Oracle Database - Standard Edition

Information Centers

Information Center: Overview Database Server/Client Installation and Upgrade/Migration [1351022.2]
Index of Oracle Database Information Centers [1568043.2]
インフォメーション・センター: データベースおよび Enterprise Manager 日本語ドキュメント [1946305.2]




The Real Risks



How Database Breaches Really Occur

- 48% involve privilege misuse
- 40% result from hacking

Types of hacking by percent of breaches within hacking and **percent of records**



- 38% utilized malware
- 28% employed social engineering
- 15% physical attacks

Percentages do not add up to 100% because many breaches employed multiple tactics in parallel or were outliers



Internal vs. External Threats

- Most organizations focus on the least likely threats and ignore what has been historically proven to be the greatest threat
- The following is quoted from "Reference for Business" on the subject of computer crimes

As criminologist and computer-insurance executive Ron Hale indicated to Tim McCollum of *Nation's Business*, one of the most unsettling facts about computer crime is that **the greatest threat to information security for small businesses is their employees**. As McCollum noted, **"a company's employees typically have access to its personal computers and computer networks, and often they know precisely what business information is valuable and where to find it."** The reasons for these betrayals are many, ranging from workplace dissatisfaction to financial or family difficulties.

- When organizations focus on their firewall they are focusing on what is often the most expensive, yet least effective, protection against data theft
- Part of our job is to provide solutions that address vulnerabilities and minimize our organization's risk exposure
- The other part is to be educators ... to educate our internal and external customers the nature of real-world threats
- The education needs to come from us ... not from someone in sales



CYBER WAR

A conflict without foot soldiers, guns, or missiles




The image shows a man in a dark sweater speaking on a stage. To his right is a presentation slide with a white background and a blue arrow icon in the top right corner. The slide title is 'Cyber Attacks: More Data Stolen Every Year' with a subtitle 'Cyber Criminals and State Actors are Winning the Cyber War'. The slide lists three main points with sub-points detailing data breaches at Equifax, the Office of Personnel Management, and the general trend of data theft by cyber criminals and state actors.

Cyber Attacks: More Data Stolen Every Year

Cyber Criminals and State Actors are Winning the Cyber War

- Equifax: Records of 143,000,000 Americans plus...
 - Credit Card Numbers, Social Security Numbers, home addresses...
 - Equifax CEO, executives and IT management team resigns
- Office of Personnel Management: Records of 20 Million Federal Employees
 - Security clearance data, finger print data, social security numbers, home addresses
 - White House, Foreign Embassies, State Department, Defense Department...
 - Director of OPM Resigns
- Cyber Criminals and State Actors steal more data every year
 - Formidable and sophisticated adversaries stealing corporate & government data



Modern Cyber Security Requires More Automation
Cyber Defense: Our People versus Their Computers

- Most Data Thefts Occur **After** Security Fix Available
 - Target did not detect the attack
 - Target behind in applying security patches
 - Wrong priorities
 - Waiting for downtime window



The image shows a man in a dark sweater speaking on a stage. To his right is a presentation slide with a white background and a blue arrow icon in the top right corner. The slide contains the following text:

Modern Cyber Security Requires More Automation
Security & Database Automation Work Together to Prevent Data Theft

- **Cyber Defense System:** Automatically Detects Attacks in Real-Time
 - Automated Intrusion Detection
- **Database System:** Automatically and Immediately Secures Your Data
 - Automated database immediately **patches itself while running**
 - No delay for downtime window, **no manual intervention**
 - Recovers data that's deleted by ransomware, etc.

It Must Be "Our Computers" vs "Their Computers"



Anyone want to play chess with Deep Blue?

Anyone want to take a shot at AlphaGo?



The threat is not a bunch of 20 year old script kiddies

If the threat is an organized crime family you will find your data being sold on the dark web

If the threat is a nation-state you will find your data being used to attack your country, your community, your family

This Is How You Need To See Your Future




We Need To Arm Ourselves With Skills



Database Risks

- Most databases break-ins are never detected and never reported
- What you hear about is the part of the iceberg above the water
- Database related risks fall into three broad categories
 - Data Theft
 - Data Alteration
 - Transforming the database into an attack tool
- To accomplish the above activities requires gaining access and doing so generally falls into one of the following categories
 - Utilizing granted privileges and privilege escalation
 - Access to Oracle built-in packages
 - SQL Injection attacks



A Dose Of DBA Reality (1:6)

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_address('www.umn.edu') from dual;

UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS('WWW.UMN.EDU')
-----
134.84.119.107

SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('134.84.119.025') from dual;

UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME('134.84.119.025')
-----
g-smtp-w.tc.umn.edu
```

- It takes precisely this much PL/SQL to compromise an internal network

```
DECLARE
  h_name VARCHAR2(60);
  test_ip VARCHAR2(12) := '134.84.119.';
  suffixn NUMBER(3) := 0;
  suffixv VARCHAR2(4);
BEGIN
  FOR i IN 1 .. 255 LOOP
    suffixn := suffixn + 1;
    IF suffixn < 10 THEN suffixv := '00' || TO_CHAR(suffixn);
    ELSIF suffixn BETWEEN 10 and 99 THEN suffixv := '0' || TO_CHAR(suffixn);
    ELSE suffixv := TO_CHAR(suffixn); END IF;
    BEGIN
      SELECT utl_inaddr.get_host_name(test_ip || suffixv)
      INTO h_name
      FROM dual;
      dbms_output.put_line(test_ip || suffixv || ' - ' || h_name);
    EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN NULL;
    END;
  END LOOP;
END;
/
```

A Dose Of DBA Reality (2:6)

■ The listing output

```
134.84.119.001 - x-134-84-119-1.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.002 - x-134-84-119-2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.003 - x-134-84-119-3.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.004 - x-134-84-119-4.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.005 - lsv-dd.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.006 - mta-w2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.007 - isrv-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.010 - mta-a2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.011 - x-134-84-119-9.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.012 - x-134-84-119-10.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.013 - x-134-84-119-11.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.014 - x-134-84-119-12.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.015 - x-134-84-119-13.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.016 - x-134-84-119-14.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.017 - diamond.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.020 - x-134-84-119-16.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.021 - oamethyst.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.022 - x-134-84-119-18.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.023 - x-134-84-119-19.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.024 - vs-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.025 - g-smtp-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.026 - mta-w1.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.027 - x-134-84-119-23.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.030 - x-134-84-119-24.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.031 - x-134-84-119-25.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.032 - x-134-84-119-26.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.033 - x-134-84-119-27.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.034 - x-134-84-119-28.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.035 - mon-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.036 - ldapauth-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.037 - ldap-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.040 - mta-w3.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.041 - x-134-84-119-33.tc.umn.edu
```

```
134.84.119.042 - x-134-84-119-34.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.043 - smtp-w2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.044 - relay-w2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.045 - x-134-84-119-37.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.046 - x-134-84-119-38.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.047 - x-134-84-119-39.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.050 - x-134-84-119-40.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.051 - x-134-84-119-41.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.052 - x-134-84-119-42.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.053 - x-134-84-119-43.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.054 - x-134-84-119-44.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.055 - lsv-w.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.056 - x-134-84-119-46.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.057 - lists.umn.edu
134.84.119.060 - x-134-84-119-48.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.061 - plaza.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.062 - x-134-84-119-50.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.063 - x-134-84-119-51.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.064 - x-134-84-119-52.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.065 - x-134-84-119-53.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.066 - x-134-84-119-54.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.067 - x-134-84-119-55.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.070 - x-134-84-119-56.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.071 - x-134-84-119-57.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.072 - x-134-84-119-58.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.073 - x-134-84-119-59.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.074 - isrv-d2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.075 - ldapauth-d2.tc.umn.edu.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.076 - ldap-d2.tc.umn.edu.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.077 - x-134-84-119-63.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.100 - x-134-84-119-100.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.101 - aquamarine.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.102 - x-134-84-119-102.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.103 - x-134-84-119-103.tc.umn.edu
```

```
134.84.119.104 - mon-m.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.105 - mta-m2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.106 - x-134-84-119-106.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.107 - isrv-m.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.108 - mta-m4.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.109 - x-134-84-119-109.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.110 - x-134-84-119-110.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.111 - x-134-84-119-111.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.112 - x-134-84-119-112.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.113 - x-134-84-119-113.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.114 - oaqua.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.115 - x-134-84-119-115.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.116 - x-134-84-119-116.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.117 - x-134-84-119-117.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.118 - x-134-84-119-118.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.119 - x-134-84-119-119.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.120 - vs-m.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.121 - g-smtp-m.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.122 - mta-m1.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.123 - x-134-84-119-123.tc.umn.edu
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134.84.119.126 - g-smtp-m4.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.127 - x-134-84-119-127.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.128 - x-134-84-119-128.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.129 - x-134-84-119-129.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.130 - ldapauth-m.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.131 - ldap-m.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.132 - mta-m3.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.133 - x-134-84-119-133.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.134 - x-134-84-119-134.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.135 - smtp-m2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.136 - relay-m2.tc.umn.edu
134.84.119.137 - x-134-84-119-137.tc.umn.edu
```



A Dose Of DBA Reality (3:6)

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_address('www.utah.edu') from dual;

UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS('WWW.UTAH.EDU')
-----
155.97.137.55

SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('155.97.137.55') from dual;

UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME('155.97.137.55')
-----
test.www.utah.edu
```

- It takes precisely this much PL/SQL to compromise an internal network

```
DECLARE
  h_name VARCHAR2(60);
  test_ip VARCHAR2(12) := '155.97.137.';
  suffixn NUMBER(3) := 0;
  suffixv VARCHAR2(4);
BEGIN
  FOR i IN 1 .. 255 LOOP
    suffixn := suffixn + 1;
    IF suffixn < 10 THEN suffixv := '00' || TO_CHAR(suffixn);
    ELSIF suffixn BETWEEN 10 and 99 THEN suffixv := '0' || TO_CHAR(suffixn);
    ELSE suffixv := TO_CHAR(suffixn); END IF;
    BEGIN
      SELECT utl_inaddr.get_host_name(test_ip || suffixv)
      INTO h_name
      FROM dual;
      dbms_output.put_line(test_ip || suffixv || ' - ' || h_name);
    EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN NULL;
    END;
  END LOOP;
END;
/
```

A Dose Of DBA Reality (4:6)

■ From room 0170 using personal wifi

```
155.97.136.006 - avaya-cms.vs.utah.edu
155.97.136.110 - dbw1.it.utah.edu
155.97.136.111 - sql-om.it.utah.edu
155.97.136.112 - sql-cm.it.utah.edu
155.97.136.113 - sql-bes.it.utah.edu
155.97.136.117 - dbw23.it.utah.edu
155.97.136.140 - d-ad.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.141 - d-hsc.hscdev.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.147 - d-mim.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.148 - d-ads.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.149 - fim.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.150 - d-ars.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.153 - d-adlds.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.157 - d-candes.addev.utah.edu
155.97.136.200 - b3.ddi.utah.edu

155.97.137.007 - slb1-campus-ddc-i11.net.utah.edu
155.97.137.010 - slb2-campus-ddc-j11.net.utah.edu
155.97.137.011 - slb-campus-ddc-vip.net.utah.edu
155.97.137.012 - slb3-campus-ddc-i11.net.utah.edu
155.97.137.021 - astra.utah.edu
155.97.137.022 - dars.sys.utah.edu
155.97.137.024 - webct.utah.edu
155.97.137.025 - jira.acs.utah.edu
155.97.137.026 - webctold.utah.edu
155.97.137.027 - stage.exchange.utah.edu
155.97.137.031 - my.utah.edu
155.97.137.032 - onboard.utah.edu
155.97.137.033 - uquest.utah.edu
155.97.137.034 - mytest.utah.edu
155.97.137.035 - campusmasterplan.utah.edu
155.97.137.036 - autodiscover.coe.utah.edu
```

```
155.97.137.040 - appdb.it.utah.edu
155.97.137.041 - gsa.search.utah.edu
155.97.137.043 - mrte.cc.utah.edu
155.97.137.044 - unite.utah.edu
155.97.137.045 - test.sys.utah.edu
155.97.137.046 - smtp.o365.umail.utah.edu
155.97.137.047 - vip-ipo.cc.utah.edu
155.97.137.050 - ipohsc.utah.edu
155.97.137.051 - staging.egi.utah.edu
155.97.137.052 - smtp.utah.edu
155.97.137.053 - ipo-forward.cc.utah.edu
155.97.137.054 - webstats8.utah.edu
155.97.137.055 - sdc8.utah.edu
155.97.137.060 - eq.utah.edu
155.97.137.061 - blocku.acs.utah.edu
155.97.137.062 - csmssl1.test.utah.edu
155.97.137.063 - sharepoint.it.utah.edu
155.97.137.066 - uitapp.it.utah.edu
155.97.137.067 - test.www.utah.edu
155.97.137.071 - ezproxy.test.utah.edu
155.97.137.072 - internalhub.umail.utah.edu
155.97.137.074 - legacy.umail.utah.edu
155.97.137.077 - ldap.acs.utah.edu
155.97.137.100 - go.utah.edu
155.97.137.102 - testvip2.sys.utah.edu
155.97.137.103 - ulogin.utah.edu
155.97.137.104 - jira.sys.utah.edu
155.97.137.105 - exc-sentry.med.utah.edu
155.97.137.106 - people.utah.edu
155.97.137.107 - www.test.utah.edu
155.97.137.109 - idp.idm.utah.edu
155.97.137.110 - gis-reporting.fm.utah.edu
155.97.137.114 - training.identity.utah.edu
155.97.137.118 - templates.utah.edu
155.97.137.150 - umailx.umail.utah.edu
155.97.137.223 - ese.idm.utah.edu
155.97.137.229 - test.go.utah.edu
155.97.137.232 - jira.test.utah.edu
155.97.137.234 - d-pki.addev.utah.edu
155.97.137.236 - gatetest.acs.utah.edu
155.97.137.237 - gatedev.acs.utah.edu
```



Shifting Our Paradigm



First Concept

- To be successful you must accept the following

Break-ins will occur.

Those who fail to study history are doomed to repeat it.



Second Concept

- To be successful you must accept the following

Your job is to increase the difficulty of breaking in.

If your management doesn't grasp this reality then it is your responsibility to explain it to them.

Securing existing databases is more important than deploying another insecure database.



Third Concept

- To be successful you must accept the following

When someone breaks in the system must be configured to limit the damage.

On Installation

- Disable the DEFAULT profile
- Revoke almost all privileges granted to PUBLIC
- Enable all of the database's default security capabilities

After Installation

- Apply security patches immediately
- Stop using cron - use DBMS_SCHEDULER
- Change passwords regularly - automate the process
- Do not grant the CONNECT, RESOURCE, or DBA roles ever
- Use Proxy Users for every connecting user you create
- Implement Database Vault
- Implement Row Level Security

- There is always someone inside the firewall
- There is always someone with access
- There is a big difference between accessing one record ... and accessing everything
- Most databases in the US are configured so that once someone breaks in they get everything




Oracle's Larry Ellison decries poor state of security,



"We need much better security," Ellison said Tuesday in a speech at Oracle OpenWorld. "We need a next generation of security because we're not winning a lot of these cyberbattles. We haven't lost the war, but we're losing a lot of battles."

An Oracle Corporate View of Security

- Very valuable ... but insufficient



The diagram illustrates a multi-layered security architecture. At the center is a red cylinder labeled "Data". Surrounding it are several concentric, semi-transparent red cylinders, each representing a different security layer. From the innermost to the outermost, the layers are labeled: Encryption, Authentication, Authorization, Auditing, Monitoring and Blocking, Secure Configuration, and Data Masking.

- Oracle Advanced Security
- Oracle Identity Management
- Oracle Database Vault
- Oracle Label Security
- Oracle Audit Vault
- Oracle Total Recall
- Oracle Database Firewall
- Oracle Configuration Management
- Oracle Data Masking

Comprehensive – Transparent – Easy to Deploy – Proven!


- Security requires that you implement what is "free" too

Virtual Private Database aka Row Level Security (VPD / RLS)


- Requires Enterprise Edition (no extra licensing required)
- Provides row-level security at the database table or view level
- Can be extended to provide column-level security as well
- Essentially, creates or modifies an existing WHERE clause rewriting a query in the optimizer so that the query cannot return restricted rows or columns
- Based on the built-in DBMS_RLS package

```
FUNCTION empview_sec(owner VARCHAR2, objname VARCHAR2) RETURN VARCHAR2 IS
  predicate VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
  IF (sys_context('exp_rpt', 'exp_role') = 'manager') THEN
    predicate := 'cost_center_id = sys_context(''exp_rpt'', ''cc_number'')';
  ELSE
    predicate := 'employee_id = sys_context(''exp_rpt'', ''emp_number'')';
  END IF;
  RETURN predicate;
END empview_sec;
```

Oracle GoldenGate Data Flow



Oracle GoldenGate Data Flow with Meta7 PPDL18



Supported Environments

Data and Transaction Sources	Data and Transaction Targets	Operating Systems	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Cassandra▪ HP SQL/MP▪ HP SQL/MX▪ IBM DB2 (LUW)▪ IBM DB2 (Z/OS)▪ IBM DB2 for I (AS/400)▪ IBM Informix▪ JMS message queues▪ Microsoft SQL Server▪ Oracle Database▪ Oracle MySQL▪ Oracle TimesTen▪ Sybase ASE▪ Tandem▪ Teradata	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Amazon S3▪ Big Data<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ ALO Framework▪ Apache Flume▪ Apache Hadoop▪ Apache HBase▪ Apache Hive▪ Apache Kafka▪ Apache Spark▪ Apache Storm▪ AVRO▪ Base24 (ATM & POS)▪ HDFS▪ JSON▪ MongoDB▪ Cassandra▪ EMC Greenplum▪ HP Enscribe▪ HP SQL/MP▪ HP SQL/MX	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ IBM DB2 (LUW)▪ IBM DB2 (Z/OS)▪ IBM DB2 for I (AS/400)▪ IBM Informix▪ IBM Netezza▪ IBM System I▪ IBM System Z/OS▪ JMS Message Queue▪ Microsoft SQL Server▪ ODBC Databases▪ Oracle Database▪ Oracle MySQL▪ Oracle NoSQL▪ Oracle TimesTen▪ Sybase ASE▪ Tandem▪ Teradata▪ Flat Files▪ XML Files	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ HPUX IA64▪ HP NonStop Itanium▪ IBM AIX▪ IBM z/OS▪ IBM iSeries▪ Linux x86-64▪ Oracle Solaris Sparc▪ Oracle Solaris x86-64▪ Windows x86-64▪ z/Linux (IBM mainframe)▪ Cloud environments





Perimeter Defense

Database Networks

- Attempts are being made essentially 7 x 24 x 365 to attack your organizations
- If you do not know this then you have insufficient monitoring and most likely many of the attempts are success
- A small division of one of America's largest retailers has not been able to identify a single 24 hour period in the last 5 years during which there was not at least one serious, professional, attempt to access their data



Perimeter Defense (1:3)

- Perimeter defense has never worked
- Did any castle ever built survive all attacks?
- Did the "impenetrable" Maginot line protect France?
- Did every major break-in in you have ever heard of only succeed because the target didn't have a firewall? Or Identity Management?

Breach exposes at least 58 million accounts, includes names, jobs, and more

With 2 months left, more than 2.2 billion records dumped so far in 2016.

DAN GOODIN - 10/12/2016, 2:29 PM



Hejin Richards

Perimeter Defense (2:3)

- Many organizations think they are protected because they have a firewall
- The following example is real and came from a customer security audit
- The firewall's configuration, discovered during an audit, allowed direct access from the internet (UNTRUST) to the database servers (BUSINESS-DATA)
- The organization's employees did not understand the rules they wrote

ICMP Allowed from outside to Business-Data Zone

```
set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping match source-address any
set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping match destination-address any
set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping match application junos-ping
set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping then permit
set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping then log session-close
```



Perimeter Defense (3:3)

- A firewall should give you no sense of comfort
- Here is another firewall rule set-up discovered during a security audit
- This example cancels the stateful feature of the firewall and make it just like a switch or router with security rules (ACLs)
- All traffic is allowed both from/to the outside interface with security level 0

```
dc-fwsm-app configurations
```

```
1094 access-list INBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any  
3735 access-group INBOUND-CAMPUS in interface OUTSIDE  
1096 access-list OUTBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any  
3736 access-group OUTBOUND-CAMPUS out interface OUTSIDE
```

```
dc-fwsm-db configurations
```

```
access-list INBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any  
access-group INBOUND-CAMPUS in interface OUTSIDE
```

```
access-list OUTBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any  
access-group OUTBOUND-CAMPUS out interface OUTSIDE
```

Database Networks


- Every Oracle Database deployment requires multiple network connections

Name	Protocol	Utilization
Management	TCP/IP	System Admin connection to the server's light's-out management card
Public	TCP/IP	Access for applications, DBAs, exports, imports, backups: No keep-alive if RAC
SAN Storage	Fibre Channel	Server connection to a Storage Area Network (SAN)
NAS Storage	TCP/IP or IB	Connection to an NFS or DNFS mounted storage array
RAC Cache Fusion interconnect	UDP or IB	Jumbo Frames, no keep-alive, with custom configured read and write caching
Replication	TCP/IP	Data Guard and GoldenGate
Backup and Import/Export	TCP/IP	RMAN, DataPump, CommVault, Data Domain, ZFS, ZDLRA

- Every one of these networks provides access to critical infrastructure
- No conversation on networking is complete without considering firewalls, DNS and NTP servers, load balancers, and a large variety of mobile and Internet of Things devices



Example Minimum Environment





Security Support Resources

IASE Information Assurance Support Environment

All Sites

Home Cybersecurity Training Topic Map STIGs Tools News Help RSS Feeds

Home > STIGs

Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)

STIGs Updates!

- [Cisco ISR 4000 Series STIG Version 1 Overview - Update 4/18/2017](#)
- [Cisco ISR 4000 Series STIG Version 1 Release Memo - Update 4/18/2017](#)
- [Cisco ISR 4000 Series NDM STIG - Version 1 - Update 4/18/2017](#)
- [Cisco ISR 4000 Series RTR STIG - Version 1 - Update 4/18/2017](#)
- [Draft Adobe Acrobat Pro XI STIG - Version 1 - Update 4/11/2017](#)
- [Draft Adobe Acrobat Pro XI STIG - Comment Matrix - Update 4/11/2017](#)
- [Draft Adobe Acrobat Pro XI STIG - Release Memo - Update 4/7/2017](#)
- [McAfee Application Control 7.x STIG Version 1 - Update 4/18/2017](#)

The Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and the NSA Guides are the configuration standards for DOD IA and IA-enabled devices/systems. Since 1998, DISA has played a critical role enhancing the security posture of DoD's security systems by providing the Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs). The STIGs contain technical guidance to "lock down" information systems/software that might otherwise be vulnerable to a malicious computer attack.

Questions or comments?
Please contact DISA STIG Customer Support Desk:
disa.stig_spt@mail.mil

STIGs Home
Control Correlation Identifier (CCI)
DoD Annex for NIAP Protection Profiles
DoD Secure Host Baseline Repository *PKI
FAQs
IAVM
Quarterly Release Schedule and Summary
SRG/STIG Tools
SRG-STIG Library Compilations
STIG Mailing List
STIGs Master List (A to Z)
STIGs Technologies
Vendor Process
Contact Us
*PKI = DoD PKI Cert Required

<http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/index.aspx>

- A STIG is a Security Technical Implementation Guide produced or approved by the US Department of Defense
- Oracle has published STIGs at My Oracle Support for Exadata and ODA
 - But the "CHECK" option can be run on any Linux server
- Oracle Support provides a downloadable script that can be used to check an ODA against STIG requirements and identify three levels of violations
- We strongly recommend running the script with the **-check** option but recommend having your Linux System Admin correct those issues you wish to correct manually

Warning: Never run the STIG script with the -fix option

- Ctrl-Alt-Del combination to shutdown system is enabled
- Password for grub not enabled
- Privilege account 'halt' is present
- Privilege account 'shutdown' is present
- RealVNC rpm is installed on system
- sendmail decode command is not commented in /etc/aliases
- **Support for USB device found in kernel**



Document Display

https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/SearchDocDisplay?_adf.ctrl-state=8gv63d6pu_9&_afLoop=44873298819788

ORACLE MY ORACLE SUPPORT

PowerView is Off

Daniel (Available) (0) Contact Us Help

Dashboard Knowledge Service Requests Patches & Updates Community Certifications Systems Collector

Document Display

Search: oda stig

Back to Results

- STIG Implementation Script for Oracle Database Appliance (1461102.1)
- Oracle Database Appliance DoD C&A STIG (1456609.1)
- Oracle Database Appliance Upgrade Steps Finding Tool (1519650.1)
- Oracle Database Appliance - 12.1.2 and 2.X Supported ODA Versions & Known Issues (888888.1)
- Information Center: Oracle Database Appliance (1417713.2)
- OTN doc for 12c Cloud Control on ODA (1673246.1)
- ODA (Oracle Database Appliance) Different Disks Randomly Disappear After a Reboot (1420126.1)
- ALERT Diskgroup Corruption Due to Invalid ASM Block Header [endian_kfbh] for Devices Larger Than 2TB with ADVM Volume on X5-2 ODA - 12.1.2.2 and 12.1.2.3 Only (2038152.1)
- Guest VM Running Slow and is not Able to Use All the CPUs Assigned to it on ODA (1928868.1)
- Physical Infiniband Link Will Go Down When on Surviving Node When One Node Is Shutdown in ODA X5-2 (2013879.1)

Load More... Back to Results

★ STIG Implementation Script for Oracle Database Appliance (Doc ID 1461102.1)

To Bottom

APPLIES TO:

Oracle Database Appliance - Version All Versions and later
Oracle Database Appliance Software - Version 2.2.0.0 to 12.1.2.4 [Release 2.2 to 12.1]
Linux x86-64

GOAL

The ODA STIG script provides prescriptive steps that can be used to both assess and improve the security configuration of the Oracle Database Appliance. This script is based on the Oracle Linux 5 Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) that can be found at <http://iase.disa.mil>.

For more information Please contact tammy.bednar@oracle.com

SOLUTION

Download the latest STIG script>

Was this document helpful?

Yes
 No

Document Details

Type:	HOWTO
Status:	REVIEWED
Last Major Update:	Sep 11, 2015
Last Update:	Sep 11, 2015

Related Products

- Oracle Database Appliance Software
- Oracle Database Appliance

Information Centers

- Information Center: Oracle Database Appliance [1417713.2]



Center For Internet Security (CIS)

- CIS is the source of audit guidelines and auditors for e-commerce websites



The screenshot shows the CIS website homepage. At the top right, the tagline "Confidence in the Connected World" is displayed. The CIS logo and name "Center for Internet Security" are on the left. A navigation bar includes "Cybersecurity Best Practices", "Cybersecurity Tools", and "Cybersecurity Threats". A "Quick Links" section contains "CIS Controls", "CIS Benchmarks", "CIS-CAT Pro", and "MS-ISAC". A search bar is located below the quick links. A blue banner features the text: "CIS harnesses the power of a global IT community to safeguard public and private organizations against cyber threats." To the right, the MS-ISAC logo and text "CIS is home to the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center" are shown, with a "Learn more" link. A footer section contains three columns of text: "Consensus-based Guidelines" (CIS Benchmarks and CIS Controls are consensus-based guides curated), "Objective Standards" (Our security best practices are referenced global standards verified by), and "Secure Online Experience" (CIS is an independent, non-profit organization with a mission to).

<https://www.cisecurity.org>



User Management

Application Access

- At many major Oracle customers there are two types of users defined
 - human: a sentient human will use this user-id to log on
 - mechid: an application or application server will use this user-id to connect
- All application schemas should be created with a mechid
- Application schemas should be granted the privileges required to create objects then
 - Revoke all system privileges from the application schema
 - Lock the schema and expire the password
 - Audit attempts to log onto the application schema directly

```
SQL> ALTER USER ps ACCOUNT LOCK;  
SQL> REVOKE create session FROM ps;  
SQL> REVOKE create table FROM ps;  
SQL> REVOKE create procedure FROM ps;  
SQL> REVOKE create view FROM ps;  
SQL> ... enable auditing
```


Users

New: 12cR1

AUDSYS
GSMADMIN_INTERNAL
GSMCATUSER
GSMUSER
PDBADMIN
SYSBACKUP
SYSDG
SYSKM

New: 12cR2

APEX_050100
APEX_INSTANCE_ADMIN_USER
APEX_LISTENER
APEX_REST_PUBLIC_USER
DBJSON
DBSFUSER
GGSYS
HRREST
OBE
ORDS_METADATA
ORDS_PUBLIC_USER
PDBADMIN
REMOTE_SCHEDULER_AGENT
RESTFUL
SYS\$UMF
SYSRAC
XDBEXT
XDBPM
XFILES

Dropped

BI, OE, PM, SH, and SPATIAL_WFS_USR



New Users With Escalated Privs

USERNAME	Usage
GGSYS	The internal account used by Oracle GoldenGate. It should not be unlocked or used for a database login.
SYSBACKUP	This privilege allows a user to perform backup and recovery operations either from Oracle Recovery Manager (RMAN) or SQL*Plus.
SYSDG	This privilege allows a user to perform Data Guard operations can use this privilege with either Data Guard Broker or the DGMGRL command-line interface.
SYSKM	This privilege allows a user to perform Transparent Data Encryption keystore operations.
SYSRAC	This privilege allows the Oracle agent of Oracle Clusterware to perform Oracle Real Application Clusters (Oracle RAC) operations. SYSRAC facilitates Oracle Real Application Clusters (Oracle RAC) operations by connecting to the database by the Clusterware agent on behalf of Oracle RAC utilities such as SRVCTL.



Proxy Users (1:3)

- Here's what the Oracle docs say about proxy users: They are not wrong but incomplete and misleading

About Proxy Authentication

Proxy authentication is the process of using a middle-tier for user authentication. You can design a middle-tier server to proxy clients in a secure fashion by using the following three forms of proxy authentication:

- The source of the above statement is the "Database JDBC Developer's Guide"
- Here's what Tom Kyte wrote ...

and we said...

```
a proxy user is a user that is allowed to "connect on behalf of another user"
```

```
say you have a middle tier application. You want to use a connection pool. You need to use a single user for that. Say that user is "midtier"
```

```
Scott can grant connect through to this midtier user.
```

- And, of course Tom Kyte was correct

Proxy Users (2:3)

- ... and proxy users cannot be spoofed

So now the midtier user (which has just "create session" and "connect through to scott") authenticates to the database and sets up the connection pool. This midtier user is just a regular user -- anything you can do to scott, you can do to midtier, but it generally isn't relevant. For the only thing midtier will do in the database is connect really!

So, scott comes along and convinces the midtier "i am really scott". The midtier then says to the database "you know me, I'm midtier and I'd like to pretend to be scott for a while". the database looks and says "yes midtier, you are allowed to be scott for a while -- go ahead". At this point -- that midtier connection will have a session where by "select user from dual" will return SCOTT -- not midtier.

Scott never gave the midtier his password to the database, in fact, scott might not even KNOW what his password to the database is!

Now, this SCOTT session that was created on behalf of the midtier connection is subject to all of the rules and privs around the user SCOTT -- it can only do what scott is allowed to do.

The nice thing about this is:

- o you have auditing back, the database knows who is using it. no more of this "single username" junk.

- o you have grants back, you don't have to reinvent security over and over and over.

- o you have identity preserved all of the way from the browser through the middle tier and into the database.

Proxy Users (3:3)

```
-- create a non-human database user
SQL> CREATE USER mechid
  2 IDENTIFIED BY "A1Ac9C81292FC1CF0b8A40#5F04C0A"
  3 DEFAULT TABLESPACE uwdata
  4 TEMPORARY TABLESPACE temp
  5 QUOTA 100M ON uwdata;
```

User created.

```
SQL> ALTER USER mechid ACCOUNT LOCK;
```

Grant succeeded.

```
SQL> AUDIT CONNECT BY scott ON BEHALF OF mechid;
```

Audit succeeded.

```
-- create proxy for mechid
```

```
SQL> ALTER USER mechid GRANT CONNECT THROUGH scott;
```

User altered.

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM sys.proxy_info$;
```

CLIENT#	PROXY#	CREDENTIAL_TYPE#	FLAGS
142	109	0	5

```
SQL> conn scott[MECHID]/tiger@pdbdev
Connected.
```

```
SQL> sho user
USER is "MECHID"
```

```
SQL> SELECT sys_context('USERENV', 'CURRENT_SCHEMA')
  2 FROM dual;
```

```
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV', 'CURRENT_SCHEMA')
```

MECHID

```
SQL> SELECT sys_context('USERENV', 'CURRENT_USER')
  2 FROM dual;
```

```
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV', 'CURRENT_USER')
```

MECHID

```
SQL> SELECT sys_context('USERENV', 'PROXY_USER')
  2 FROM dual;
```

```
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV', 'PROXY_USER')
```

SCOTT

User Authentication and Permissions

- No user should be created using the default profile
- Check for default password usage
 - If you find default passwords being used either change the passwords or lock and expire the account
- Do not use externally authenticated users such as OPS\$ unless you can prove that O/S access is secure and will stay that way which, of course, you cannot do
- CIS audit check 4.07 specifically checks for the use of externally authenticated access
- With applications such as EBS, SAP, Peoplesoft, Siebel, we are finding a truly staggering number of accounts that are wide open ... still using unchanged default passwords

```
SQL> SELECT d.con_id, d.username, u.account_status
2 FROM cdb_users_with_defpwd d, cdb_users u
3 WHERE d.username = u.username
4 AND u.account_status = 'OPEN'
5 ORDER BY 3,1, 2;
```

CON_ID	USERNAME	ACCOUNT_STATUS
1	SYS	OPEN
1	SYS	OPEN
1	SYSTEM	OPEN
1	SYSTEM	OPEN
3	HR	OPEN
3	OE	OPEN
3	PM	OPEN
3	SCOTT	OPEN
3	SH	OPEN
3	SYS	OPEN
3	SYS	OPEN
3	SYSTEM	OPEN
3	SYSTEM	OPEN

Profiles (1:4)

password_life_time restricts the password lifetime will help deter brute force attacks against user accounts and refresh passwords.

password_reuse_max sets the number of different passwords that must be rotated by the user before the current password can be reused. This prevents users from cycling through a few common passwords and helps ensure the integrity and strength of user credentials.

password_reuse_time sets the amount of time that must pass before a password can be reused. Creating a long window before password reuse helps protect from password brute force attacks and helps the strength and integrity of the user credential.

password_lock_time specifies the amount of time in days that the account will be locked out if the maximum number of authentication attempts has been reached.

password_grace_time specified in days the amount of time that the user is warned to change their password before their password expires.

Profiles (2:4)

12cR1 Default

COMPOSITE_LIMIT	UNLIMITED
CONNECT_TIME	UNLIMITED
CPU_PER_CALL	UNLIMITED
CPU_PER_SESSION	UNLIMITED
FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS	10
IDLE_TIME	UNLIMITED

LOGICAL_READS_PER_CALL	UNLIMITED
LOGICAL_READS_PER_SESSION	UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME	7
PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME	180
PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME	1
PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX	UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME	UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION	NULL
PRIVATE_SGA	UNLIMITED
SESSIONS_PER_USER	UNLIMITED

12cR2 ORA_STIG_PROFILE

COMPOSITE_LIMIT	UNLIMITED
CONNECT_TIME	UNLIMITED
CPU_PER_CALL	UNLIMITED
CPU_PER_SESSION	UNLIMITED
FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS	3
IDLE_TIME	15

INACTIVE_ACCOUNT_TIME	35
LOGICAL_READS_PER_CALL	UNLIMITED
LOGICAL_READS_PER_SESSION	UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME	5
PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME	60
PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME	UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX	10
PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME	265
PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION	ORA12C_STIG_VERIFY_FUNCTION
PRIVATE_SGA	UNLIMITED
SESSIONS_PER_USER	UNLIMITED

Starting with this release, you can use the INACTIVE_ACCOUNT_TIME parameter to automatically lock the account of a database user who has not logged in to the database instance in a specified number of days.



Profiles (3:4)

- Run `$ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/utlpwdmg.sql`

```
-- This script alters the default parameters for Password Management
-- This means that all the users on the system have Password Management
-- enabled and set to the following values unless another profile is
-- created with parameter values set to different value or UNLIMITED
-- is created and assigned to the user.
```

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT
FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS      10
INACTIVE_ACCOUNT_TIME     UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME       7
PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME        UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME        1
PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME       UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX        UNLIMITED
PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION  ora12c_verify_function;
```

- Uncomment the CIS or STIG profiles for improved security

```
/**  
The below set of password profile parameters would take into consideration  
recommendations from Center for Internet Security[CIS Oracle 11g].
```

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT  
PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME 180  
PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME 7  
PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME UNLIMITED  
PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX UNLIMITED  
FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 10  
PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME 1  
INACTIVE_ACCOUNT_TIME UNLIMITED  
PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION ora12c_verify_function;  
*/
```

```
/**  
The below set of password profile parameters would take into  
consideration recommendations from Department of Defense Database  
Security Technical Implementation Guide[STIG v8R1].
```

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT  
PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME 60  
PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME 365  
PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX 5  
FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 3  
PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION ora12c_strong_verify_function;*/
```

Secure Configuration

- A script run as part of installation that creates a "secure configuration"
- Review the script `$ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/secconf.sql`

```
Rem    Secure configuration settings for the database include a reasonable
Rem    default password profile, password complexity checks, audit settings
Rem    (enabled, with admin actions audited), and as many revokes from PUBLIC
Rem    as possible. In the first phase, only the default password profile is included.
```

Can perform the following

- Modifies the Default profile
- Creates audit policy: `ORA_ACCOUNT_MGMT`
- Creates audit policy: `ORA_DATABASE_PARAMETER`
- Creates audit policy: `ORA_LOGON_FAILURES`
- Creates audit policy: `ORA_SECURECONFIG`
- Creates audit policy: `ORA_CIS_RECOMMENDATIONS`
- Executed indirectly when `$ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/catproc.sql` is run



Roles (1:2)

- Roles can be further protected through passwords and PL/SQL package validation

```
-- role secured by password
CREATE ROLE read_only IDENTIFIED BY "S0^Sorry";

-- role secured by PL/SQL package
CREATE OR REPLACE PACKAGE db_security AUTHID CURRENT_USER IS
    PROCEDURE enable_role;
END db_security;
/

CREATE OR REPLACE PACKAGE BODY db_security IS
    PROCEDURE enable_role IS
    BEGIN
        dbms_session.set_role('read_only');
    END enable_role;
END db_security;
/

SELECT * FROM dba_application_roles;

CREATE ROLE read_only IDENTIFIED USING db_security;
```

- A PL/SQL package can perform numerous tests to identify the user and their connection before granting access
- If the package object returns an exception the role is not granted

Roles (2:2)

12cR1 New

ADM_PARALLEL_EXECUTE_TASK
APEX_GRANTS_FOR_NEW_USERS_ROLE
AUDIT_ADMIN
AUDIT_VIEWER
CAPTURE_ADMIN
CDB_DBA
DBAHADOOP
DV_AUDIT_CLEANUP
DV_GOLDENGATE_ADMIN
DV_GOLDENGATE_REDO_ACCESS
DV_MONITOR
DV_PATCH_ADMIN
DV_STREAMS_ADMIN
DV_XSTREAM_ADMIN
EM_EXPRESS_ALL
EM_EXPRESS_BASIC
GSMADMIN_ROLE
GSMUSER_ROLE
GSM_POOLADMIN_ROLE
HS_ADMIN_SELECT_ROLE
LBAC_DBA
OPTIMIZER_PROCESSING_RATE
PDB_DBA
PROVISIONER
XS_CACHE_ADMIN
XS_NAMESPACE_ADMIN
XS_RESOURCE
XS_SESSION_ADMIN

12cR1 Dropped

DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE

12cR2 New

APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE
APPLICATION_TRACE_VIEWER
DATAPATCH_ROLE
DBJAVASCRIPT
DBMS_MDX_INTERNAL
DV_POLICY_OWNER
GGSYS_ROLE
RDFCTX_ADMIN
RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER_VPD
SODA_APP
SYSUMF_ROLE
XFILES_ADMINISTRATOR
XFILES_USER
XS_CONNECT

12cR2 Dropped

DBAHADOOP
SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN
WFS_USR_ROLE
XS_RESOURCE





System & Object Privs

Granting Privileges

- The rule is simple ... never grant privileges in excess of those required to perform a specified job function
- Don't grant "ANY" privileges without documented justification
- If you have not done so in the last 12 months review all users for their system privileges and revoke those not required
- There is literally no excuse for granting Oracle's DBA role to any user
 - No one should have privileges they don't need and don't know what they do



System Privileges Granted to the DBA Role

```
SQL> select privilege
  2 FROM dba_sys_privs
  3 WHERE grantee = 'DBA'
  4 ORDER BY 1;

PRIVILEGE
-----
ADMINISTER ANY SQL TUNING SET
ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER
ADMINISTER RESOURCE MANAGER
ADMINISTER SQL MANAGEMENT OBJECT
ADMINISTER SQL TUNING SET
ADVISOR
ALTER ANY ASSEMBLY
ALTER ANY CLUSTER
ALTER ANY CUBE
ALTER ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
ALTER ANY CUBE DIMENSION
ALTER ANY DIMENSION
ALTER ANY EDITION
ALTER ANY EVALUATION CONTEXT
ALTER ANY INDEX
ALTER ANY INDEXTYPE
ALTER ANY LIBRARY
ALTER ANY MATERIALIZED VIEW
ALTER ANY MEASURE FOLDER
ALTER ANY MINING MODEL
ALTER ANY OPERATOR
ALTER ANY OUTLINE
ALTER ANY PROCEDURE
ALTER ANY ROLE
ALTER ANY RULE
ALTER ANY RULE SET
ALTER ANY SEQUENCE
ALTER ANY SQL PROFILE
ALTER ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
ALTER ANY TABLE
ALTER ANY TRIGGER
ALTER ANY TYPE
ALTER DATABASE
ALTER PROFILE
ALTER RESOURCE COST
ALTER ROLLBACK SEGMENT
ALTER SESSION
ALTER SYSTEM
ALTER TABLESPACE
ALTER USER
ANALYZE ANY
ANALYZE ANY DICTIONARY
AUDIT ANY
AUDIT SYSTEM
```

```
BACKUP ANY TABLE
BECOME USER
CHANGE NOTIFICATION
COMMENT ANY MINING MODEL
COMMENT ANY TABLE
CREATE ANY ASSEMBLY
CREATE ANY CLUSTER
CREATE ANY CONTEXT
CREATE ANY CREDENTIAL
CREATE ANY CUBE
CREATE ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
CREATE ANY CUBE DIMENSION
CREATE ANY DIMENSION
CREATE ANY DIRECTORY
CREATE ANY EDITION
CREATE ANY EVALUATION CONTEXT
CREATE ANY INDEX
CREATE ANY INDEXTYPE
CREATE ANY JOB
CREATE ANY LIBRARY
CREATE ANY MATERIALIZED VIEW
CREATE ANY MEASURE FOLDER
CREATE ANY MINING MODEL
CREATE ANY OPERATOR
CREATE ANY OUTLINE
CREATE ANY PROCEDURE
CREATE ANY RULE
CREATE ANY RULE SET
CREATE ANY SEQUENCE
CREATE ANY SQL PROFILE
CREATE ANY SQL TRANSLATION
PROFILE
CREATE ANY SYNONYM
CREATE ANY TABLE
CREATE ANY TRIGGER
CREATE ANY TYPE
CREATE ANY VIEW
CREATE ASSEMBLY
CREATE CLUSTER
CREATE CREDENTIAL
CREATE CUBE
CREATE CUBE BUILD PROCESS
CREATE CUBE DIMENSION
CREATE DATABASE LINK
CREATE DIMENSION
CREATE EVALUATION CONTEXT
CREATE EXTERNAL JOB
CREATE INDEXTYPE
CREATE JOB
CREATE LIBRARY
CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW
CREATE MEASURE FOLDER
```

```
CREATE MINING MODEL
CREATE OPERATOR
CREATE PLUGGABLE DATABASE
CREATE PROCEDURE
CREATE PROFILE
CREATE PUBLIC DATABASE LINK
CREATE PUBLIC SYNONYM
CREATE ROLE
CREATE ROLLBACK SEGMENT
CREATE RULE
CREATE RULE SET
CREATE SEQUENCE
CREATE SESSION
CREATE SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
CREATE SYNONYM
CREATE TABLE
CREATE TABLESPACE
CREATE TRIGGER
CREATE TYPE
CREATE USER
CREATE VIEW
DEBUG ANY PROCEDURE
DEBUG CONNECT SESSION
DELETE ANY CUBE DIMENSION
DELETE ANY MEASURE FOLDER
DELETE ANY TABLE
DEQUEUE ANY QUEUE
DROP ANY ASSEMBLY
DROP ANY CLUSTER
DROP ANY CONTEXT
DROP ANY CUBE
DROP ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
DROP ANY CUBE DIMENSION
DROP ANY DIRECTORY
DROP ANY EDITION
DROP ANY EVALUATION CONTEXT
DROP ANY INDEX
DROP ANY INDEXTYPE
DROP ANY LIBRARY
DROP ANY MATERIALIZED VIEW
DROP ANY MEASURE FOLDER
DROP ANY MINING MODEL
DROP ANY OPERATOR
DROP ANY OUTLINE
DROP ANY PROCEDURE
DROP ANY ROLE
DROP ANY RULE
DROP ANY SEQUENCE
DROP ANY SQL PROFILE
DROP ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
```

```
DROP ANY SYNONYM
DROP ANY TABLE
DROP ANY TRIGGER
DROP ANY TYPE
DROP ANY VIEW
DROP PROFILE
DROP PUBLIC DATABASE LINK
DROP PUBLIC SYNONYM
DROP ROLLBACK SEGMENT
DROP TABLESPACE
DROP USER
EM EXPRESS CONNECT
ENQUEUE ANY QUEUE
EXECUTE ANY ASSEMBLY
EXECUTE ANY CLASS
EXECUTE ANY EVALUATION CONTEXT
EXECUTE ANY INDEXTYPE
EXECUTE ANY LIBRARY
EXECUTE ANY OPERATOR
EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE
EXECUTE ANY PROGRAM
EXECUTE ANY RULE
EXECUTE ANY RULE SET
EXECUTE ANY TYPE
EXECUTE ASSEMBLY
EXEMPT DDL REDACTION POLICY
EXEMPT DML REDACTION POLICY
EXPORT FULL DATABASE
FLASHBACK ANY TABLE
FLASHBACK ARCHIVE ADMINISTER
FORCE ANY TRANSACTION
FORCE TRANSACTION
GLOBAL QUERY REWRITE
GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE
GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE
GRANT ANY ROLE
IMPORT FULL DATABASE
INSERT ANY CUBE DIMENSION
INSERT ANY MEASURE FOLDER
INSERT ANY TABLE
LOCK ANY TABLE
LOGMINING
MANAGE ANY FILE GROUP
MANAGE ANY QUEUE
MANAGE FILE GROUP
MANAGE SCHEDULER
MANAGE TABLESPACE
MERGE ANY VIEW
ON COMMIT REFRESH
QUERY REWRITE
READ ANY FILE GROUP
READ ANY TABLE
```

```
READ ANY TABLE
REDEFINE ANY TABLE
RESTRICTED SESSION
RESUMABLE
SELECT ANY CUBE
SELECT ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
SELECT ANY CUBE DIMENSION
SELECT ANY DICTIONARY
SELECT ANY MEASURE FOLDER
SELECT ANY MINING MODEL
SELECT ANY SEQUENCE
SELECT ANY TABLE
SELECT ANY TRANSACTION
SET CONTAINER
UNDER ANY TABLE
UNDER ANY TYPE
UNDER ANY VIEW
UPDATE ANY CUBE
UPDATE ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
UPDATE ANY CUBE DIMENSION
UPDATE ANY TABLE
USE ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE

220 rows selected.
```

Do you "NEED" the DBA role?

If you think so feel free to explain why you need any of the privileges highlighted in red



System Privileges

12cR1 New

ADMINISTER KEY MANAGEMENT
ALTER ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
ALTER ANY MEASURE FOLDER
ALTER ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
CREATE ANY CREDENTIAL
CREATE ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
CREATE CREDENTIAL
CREATE PLUGGABLE DATABASE
CREATE SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
DROP ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE
EM EXPRESS CONNECT
EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY
EXEMPT DDL REDACTION POLICY
EXEMPT DML REDACTION POLICY
EXEMPT IDENTITY POLICY
EXEMPT REDACTION POLICY
INHERIT ANY PRIVILEGES
KEEP_DATE TIME
KEEP_SYSGUID
LOGMINING
PURGE DBA_RECYCLEBIN
REDEFINE ANY TABLE
SELECT ANY CUBE BUILD PROCESS
SELECT ANY MEASURE FOLDER
SET CONTAINER
SYSBACKUP
SYSDG
SYSKM
TRANSLATE ANY SQL
USE ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE

12cR2 New

ALTER ANY ANALYTIC VIEW
CREATE ANALYTIC VIEW
CREATE ANY ANALYTIC VIEW
DROP ANY ANALYTIC VIEW

ALTER ANY ATTRIBUTE DIMENSION
CREATE ANY ATTRIBUTE DIMENSION
CREATE ATTRIBUTE DIMENSION
DROP ANY ATTRIBUTE DIMENSION

ALTER ANY HIERARCHY
CREATE ANY HIERARCHY
CREATE HIERARCHY
DROP ANY HIERARCHY

ALTER LOCKDOWN PROFILE
CREATE LOCKDOWN PROFILE
DROP LOCKDOWN PROFILE

DEBUG CONNECT ANY

INHERIT ANY REMOTE PRIVILEGES

SYSRAC

USE ANY JOB RESOURCE

12cR2 Modified
SELECT ANY DICTIONARY (altered in 12.1.0.2 to exclude some objects)

Object Privileges (1:10)

- The rule is simple ... never grant privileges to objects that are not required
- If granting access to a table you have choices
 - SELECT
 - INSERT
 - UPDATE
 - DELETE
- If granting update privileges control by column whenever possible

```
GRANT UPDATE (first_name, last_name) ON person TO uwclass;
```

- No data has ever been stolen because the privileges were too granular or because someone had insufficient privileges

Object Privileges (2:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
SELECT 'REVOKE SELECT ON ' || table_name || ' FROM PUBLIC;' AS RUN_SCRIPT
FROM dba_tab_privs
WHERE grantee = 'PUBLIC'
AND table_name LIKE 'DBA%'
ORDER BY 1;
```

```
RUN_SCRIPT
```

```
-----
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_AUTO_SEGADV_CTL FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_AUTO_SEGADV_SUMMARY FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_COL_PENDING_STATS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_COL_USAGE_STATISTICS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_DBFS_HS_FIXED_PROPERTIES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_EDITIONING_VIEW_COLS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_EDITIONING_VIEW_COLS_AE FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_EXPRESSION_STATISTICS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_FLASHBACK_ARCHIVE FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_FLASHBACK_ARCHIVE_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_FLASHBACK_ARCHIVE_TS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_HEAT_MAP_SEGMENT FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_HEAT_MAP_SEG_HISTOGRAM FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_IND_PENDING_STATS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_JAVA_CLASSES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_SDO_MAPS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_SDO_STYLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_SDO_THEMES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_SR_PARTN_OPS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_SR_STLOG_STATS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_SYNC_CAPTURE_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_TAB_HISTGRM_PENDING_STATS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_TAB_PENDING_STATS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_TAB_STAT_PREFS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_TSTZ_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON DBA_XMLSCHEMA_LEVEL_VIEW FROM PUBLIC;
```

Object Privileges (3:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
SELECT UNIQUE 'REVOKE EXECUTE ON ' || table_name || ' FROM PUBLIC;' AS
RUN_SCRIPT
FROM dba_tab_privs dtp
WHERE dtp.grantee = 'PUBLIC'
AND dtp.privilege = 'EXECUTE'
AND dtp.type = 'PACKAGE'
AND ((dtp.table_name LIKE 'DBMS%') OR (dtp.table_name LIKE 'UTL%'))
ORDER BY 1;
```

```
RUN_SCRIPT
```

```
-----
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ADDM FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ADVISOR FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_APPLICATION_INFO FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_APP_CONT_PRVT FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQJMS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_CMT_TIME_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_DEQUEUELOG_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_HISTORY_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_INDEX_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_QUEUES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_QUEUE_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_SIGNATURE_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_SUBSCRIBER_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_EXP_TIMEMGR_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_IMP_INTERNAL FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQ_INV FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ASSERT FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AUTO_REPORT FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AUTO_TASK FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AW FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AW_EXP FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AW_STATS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AW_XML FROM PUBLIC;
```

Object Privileges (4:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CDC_ISUBSCRIBE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CLOBUTIL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_COMPRESSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CREDENTIAL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CRYPTO_TOOLKIT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CSX_INT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CSX_INT2 FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CUBE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CUBE_ADVISE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CUBE_ADVISE_SEC FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CUBE_EXP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CUBE_LOG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CUBE_UTIL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DATAPUMP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DATA_MINING FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DATA_MINING_TRANSFORM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DB_VERSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DDL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DEBUG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DEBUG_JDWP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DEBUG_JDWP_CUSTOM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DESCRIBE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DIMENSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DM_MODEL_EXP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_DM_MODEL_IMP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_EDITIONS_UTILITIES FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_EPG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ERRLOG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_FBT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_FILE_GROUP_EXP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_FILE_GROUP_IMP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_FREQUENT_ITEMSET FROM PUBLIC;
```



Object Privileges (5:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_GOLDENGATE_EXP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_GOLDENGATE_IMP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_GSM_NOPRIV FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_HEAT_MAP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_HIERARCHY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_HS_PARALLEL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ILM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_INDEX_UTL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_INMEMORY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ITRIGGER_UTL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JAVA FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JAVASCRIPT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JOB FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JSON FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LCR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LDAP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LDAP_UTL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOB FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOBUTIL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOGREP_EXP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOGREP_IMP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOGSTDBY_CONTEXT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_MACOLS_SESSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_MACSEC_ROLES FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_MDX_ODBO FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_METADATA FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_METADATA_DIFF FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_MVIEW_STATS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_UTILITY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_OBJECTS_UTILS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ODCI FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_OUTPUT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PARALLEL_EXECUTE FROM PUBLIC;
```

Object Privileges (6:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PART FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PCLXUTIL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PICKLER FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PLSQL_CODE_COVERAGE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PREDICTIVE_ANALYTICS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PREPROCESSOR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PROFILER FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PSP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RANDOM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_REFRESH FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_REPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RESCONFIG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RESOURCE_MANAGER FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RESOURCE_MANAGER_PRIVS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RESULT_CACHE_API FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RMGR_GROUP_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RMGR_PACT_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RMGR_PLAN_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RMIN FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ROWID FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULEADM_INTERNAL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE_ADM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE_EXP_EV_CTXS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE_EXP_RULES FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE_EXP_RULE_SETS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE_EXP_UTLI FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_RULE_IMP_OBJ FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHEDULER FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_ATTRIBUTE_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_CHAIN_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_CLASS_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_CONSTRAINT_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_CREDENTIAL_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;
```



Object Privileges (7:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_EXPORT_CALLOUTS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_FILE_WATCHER_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_JOB_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_PROGRAM_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_SCHEDULE_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_WINDOW_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHED_WINGRP_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCN FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SESSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SNAPSHOT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SNAPSHOT_UTL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SODA_DOM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SPACE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SPD FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SPM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQLDIAG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQLPA FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQLTUNE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQLTUNE_UTIL2 FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQL_MONITOR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQL_TRANSLATOR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQL_TRANSLATOR_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STANDARD FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STATS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STATS_ADVISOR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STAT_FUNCS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STAT_FUNCS_AUX FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STREAMS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STREAMS_PUB_RPC FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SUMMARY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SUM_RWEQ_EXPORT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SYNC_REFRESH FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_TF FROM PUBLIC;
```


Object Privileges (8:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_TRACE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_TRANSACTION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_TRANSFORM_EXIMP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_TYPES FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_UTILITY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_WARNING FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XA FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDBNFS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDBRESOURCE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDBUTIL_INT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDBZ FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDBZ0 FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB_CONFIG FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB_CONSTANTS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB_CONTENT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB_PRINT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB_REPOS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XDB_VERSION FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XEVENT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XLSB FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLDOM FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLGEN FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLINDEX FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLINDEX0 FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLPARSER FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLQUERY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSAVE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSCHEMA FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSCHEMA_ANNOTATE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSCHEMA_INT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSCHEMA_LSB FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSTORAGE_MANAGE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLSTORE FROM PUBLIC;
```

Object Privileges (9:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLTRANSLATIONS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XPLAN FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XQUERY FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XQUERYINT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XS_SESSIONS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ZHELP_IR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_CALL_STACK FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_COLL FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_COMPRESS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_ENCODE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_FILE FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_GDK FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_HTTP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_I18N FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_IDENT FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_INADDR FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_LMS FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_MATCH FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_NLA FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_RAW FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_REF FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_SMTP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_TCP FROM PUBLIC;  
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_URL FROM PUBLIC;
```

Object Privileges (10:10)

- Review each of these grants to PUBLIC and determine which are necessary and which put your database and data at risk
- Before removing any granted privilege be sure to validate the non-impact of the change in a QA environment

```
SELECT 'REVOKE SELECT ON ' || table_name || ' FROM PUBLIC;' AS RUN_SCRIPT
FROM dba_tab_privs
WHERE grantee = 'PUBLIC'
AND table_name LIKE 'ALL%'
ORDER BY 1;
```

```
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_ALL_TABLES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_DB_LINKS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_EDITIONING_VIEWS_AE FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_ENCRYPTED_COLUMNS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_JAVA_ARGUMENTS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_OBJECTS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_OBJECTS_AE FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_OPERATORS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_OPERATOR_COMMENTS FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_PROCEDURES FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_SOURCE FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE SELECT ON ALL_SOURCE_AE FROM PUBLIC;
```

```
SQL*Plus: Release 12.2.0.1.0 Production on Wed Feb 21 22:35:10 2018
Copyright (c) 1982, 2016, Oracle. All rights reserved.
Enter user-name: / as sysdba
Connected to:
Oracle Database 12c Enterprise Edition Release 12.2.0.1.0 - 64bit Production
```

```
SQL> SELECT grantee
2 FROM dba_tab_privs
3 WHERE table_name = 'ALL_SOURCE';
```

```
GRANTEE
```

```
-----
PUBLIC
DV_SECANALYST
```



V\$ Object Access (1:2)

- Anyone that can query Oracle X\$ and/or V\$ objects can bypass the vast majority of Oracle Database security
- Some of the objects that are critically important to protect are
 - V_\$MAPPED_SQL
 - V_\$SQL
 - V_\$SQLAREA
 - V_\$SQLAREA_PLAN_HASH
 - V_\$SQLSTATS
 - V_\$SQLSTATS_PLAN_HASH
 - V_\$SQLTEXT
 - V_\$SQLTEXT_WITH_NEWLINES
 - V_\$SQL_BIND_CAPTURE
 - V_\$SQL_BIND_DATA
 - V_\$SQL_OPTIMIZER_ENV
 - V_\$SQL_PLAN



V\$ Object Access (2:2)

- If data is not encrypted before DML the original statement can be recovered
- Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) offers no protection from this attack

```
SQL> CREATE TABLE credit_card (  
 2  ccno  VARCHAR2(19),  
 3  cname VARCHAR2(25));
```

Table created.

```
SQL> INSERT /* memtest */ INTO credit_card  
 2  VALUES ('5123-4567-8901-2345', 'Dan Morgan');
```

1 row created.

```
SQL> SELECT sql_id, sql_fulltext  
 2  FROM v$sqlarea  
 3  WHERE sql_fulltext LIKE '%memtest%';
```

SQL_ID	SQL_FULLTEXT
fy44ug06np5w4	INSERT /* memtest */ INTO credit_card VALUES ('5123-4567-8901-2345', 'Dan Morgan')
5d4p3uz59b0a1	SELECT sql_id, sql_fulltext FROM v\$sqlarea WHERE sql_fulltext LIKE '%memtest3%'

X\$ Object Access

- X\$ objects are a queryable view into database memory

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM X$KZDPSUPSF;
```

ADDR	INDX	INST_ID	CON_ID	KZDPSUPSFNM	KZDPSUPSFN	KZDPSUPSFOM
00007FF685ABAB40	0	1	0	DATA REDACTION	ALL	Supports all data redaction functionality (DBMS_REDACT).
00007FF685ABAB58	1	1	0	VIRTUAL PRIVATE DATABASE	OBJECT-LEVEL POLICY	Supports object-level VPD policies .
00007FF685ABAB70	2	1	0	VIRTUAL PRIVATE DATABASE	COLUMN-LEVEL POLICY	Supports column-level VPD policies . This corresponds to the SEC_RELEVANT_COL parameter functionality provided by DBMS_RLS.ADD_POLICY.
00007FF685ABAB88	3	1	0	UNIFIED AUDIT	OBJECT-LEVEL POLICY	Supports object-level Unified Audit policies .
00007FF685ABABA0	4	1	0	FINE GRAINED AUDIT	ALL	Supports all fine grained audit functionality (DBMS_FGA).
00007FF685ABABB8	5	1	0	TRANSPARENT DATA ENCRYPTION	COLUMN-LEVEL ENCRYPTION	Supports TDE Column level encryption .



ORADEBUG

- Anyone with access to ORADEBUG can view everything in the database's memory structures

```
source: catmacp.sql

-- Control ORADEBUG in Database Vault environment
PROCEDURE enable_oradebug;
PRAGMA SUPPLEMENTAL_LOG_DATA(enable_oradebug, AUTO_WITH_COMMIT);

PROCEDURE disable_oradebug;
PRAGMA SUPPLEMENTAL_LOG_DATA(disable_oradebug, AUTO_WITH_COMMIT);
```

DBMS_SYS_SQL

- This is, undeniably, the single most dangerous PL/SQL package inside your Oracle Database
 - DBMS_SYS_SQL
 - PARSE_AS_USER
 - 32 Overloads

```
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE create_sequence(seqname IN VARCHAR2, uname IN VARCHAR2)
AUTHID DEFINER IS
  c          NUMBER;
  DDLStr CLOB := 'CREATE SEQUENCE ';
  retVal NUMBER;
  uid       dba_users.user_id%TYPE;
BEGIN
  c := dbms_sql.open_cursor;

  DDLStr := DDLStr || seqname;

  SELECT user_id
  INTO uid
  FROM dba_users
  WHERE username = dbms_assert.schema_name(uname);

  dbms_sys_sql.parse_as_user(c, DDLStr, dbms_sql.NATIVE, uid);
  retVal := dbms_sql.execute(c);
  dbms_sql.close_cursor(c);
END create_sequence;
/
```

Overload 4 syntax

```
dbms_sys_sql.parse_as_user(
  c          IN NUMBER,
  statement  IN CLOB,
  language_flag IN NUMBER,
  userid     IN NUMBER);
```




SQL*Net

Net Services Security

- Here's what Oracle says about Net Services aka SQL*Net

Local listener administration is **secure through local operating system authentication**, which restricts listener administration to the user who started the listener or to the super user. By default, remote listener administration is disabled.

- For secure communications you need to consider the following parameters (some of which require the Advanced Security Option)

- NAMES.LDAP_AUTHENTICATE_BIND
- NAMES.LDAP_CONN_TIMEOUT
- NAMES.LDAP_PERSISTENT_SESSION
- SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION_CLIENT
- SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION_SERVER
- SQLNET.AUTHENTICATION_SERVICES
- SQLNET.CLIENT_REGISTRATION
- SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT
- SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER
- SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT
- SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER
- SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT
- SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER
- SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT
- SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER
- SQLNET.EXPIRE_TIME
- SQLNET.INBOUND_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
- SSL_CERT_REVOCATION
- SSL_CERT_FILE
- SSL_CERT_PATH
- SSL_CIPHER_SUITES
- SSL_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
- SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH
- SSL_VERSION
- TCP.CONNECT_TIMEOUT
- WALLET_LOCATION



Oracle Listener Port

- Have you changed the default port of your database from 1521 to something else to thwart an attack?
- Netstat can narrow down the choices an attacker must check in a single command
- Changing the port is item 2.11 on the CIS audit but it secures nothing

```
[oracle@gg00a dirprm]$ netstat -lntu
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp    0      0 0.0.0.0:5801           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 0.0.0.0:5901           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 0.0.0.0:111            0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 0.0.0.0:6001           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 0.0.0.0:56754          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 0.0.0.0:22             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 127.0.0.1:631          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 127.0.0.1:25           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 127.0.0.1:2208         0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp    0      0 :::47406                :::*                    LISTEN
tcp    0      0 :::1526                 :::*                    LISTEN
tcp    0      0 :::6001                 :::*                    LISTEN
tcp    0      0 :::7809                 :::*                    LISTEN
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:5353           0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:111            0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:627            0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:630            0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:631            0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:34070          0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:68             0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 0.0.0.0:45534          0.0.0.0:*               *
udp    0      0 :::5353                 :::*                    *
udp    0      0 :::49517                 :::*                    *
udp    0      0 ::1:63872              :::*                    *
udp    0      0 ::1:39693              :::*                    *
udp    0      0 :::59798                 :::*                    *
udp    0      0 ::1:19812              :::*                    *
```



DDOS Attack

- A Distributed Denial of Service attack can make a database unusable by flooding it with connection requests
- The connection rate limiter feature in Oracle Net Listener enables a DBA to limit the number of new connections handled by the listener
- When enabled, Oracle Net Listener imposes a user-specified maximum limit on the number of new connections handled by the listener every second. Depending on the configuration, the rate can be applied to a collection of endpoints, or to a specific endpoint

```
LISTENER=  
(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1521) (RATE_LIMIT=yes))
```

```
LISTENER= (ADDRESS_LIST=  
  (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1521) (RATE_LIMIT=5))  
  (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1522) (RATE_LIMIT=10))  
  (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1523))  
)
```

```
CONNECTION_RATE_LISTENER=10
```

```
LISTENER=  
  (ADDRESS_LIST=  
    (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1521) (RATE_LIMIT=yes))  
    (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1522) (RATE_LIMIT=yes))  
    (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=) (PORT=1523))  
  )
```



SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION

- Specifies the minimum client version that is allowed to connect to the database
- Someone with a valid userid and password, but the wrong Oracle client version is prevented from making a connection

Explanation	Set the login version to 11. The higher setting prevents logins by older version clients that do not use strong authentication to pass the login credentials.
Validation	<pre>grep -i ALLOWED_LOGIN_VERSION sqlnet.ora</pre>
Finding	Allowed logon version not configured.
Action	Set <code>SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION=11</code> to restrict access to version 11 clients.

Valid Node Checking (1:2)

- 38% of breaches are performed with stolen credentials ... 86% of records stolen are from breaches with stolen credentials
- To prevent someone with a valid userid and password from gaining access enable Valid Node Checking in your SQLNET.ORA file

```
valid_node_checking_registration_listener=on  
  
tcp.invited_nodes=(sales.meta7.com, hr.us.mlib.com, 144.185.5.73)  
  
tcp.excluded_nodes=(blackhat.hacker.com, mktg.us.acme.com, 144.25.5.25)
```

- "Best practice" is to hard-code in the IP addresses of
 - Application servers
 - This has the added benefit of forcing the organization to communicate with the DBA team when new application servers are added
 - If a new app server is not added to the invited list it cannot connect to the database
 - Reporting servers (Business Objects, Cognos, Crystal Reports, ...)
 - Replication servers (GoldenGate, Informatica, SharePlex...)
 - DBA team members



Valid Node Checking (2:2)

Explanation	This parameter in SQLNET.ORA causes the listener to matches incoming connection requests to invited and excluded node lists. A valid user-id/password combination is only valid if it comes in from an invited and unexcluded node.
Validation	<code>grep -i tcp.validnode_checking sqlnet.ora</code>
Finding	<p>Valid node checking not enabled in the current PROD environment. The QA system contains the following:</p> <pre>VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_LISTENER_SCAN3=OFF VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_LISTENER_SCAN2=OFF VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_LISTENER_SCAN1=OFF VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_LISTENER = SUBNET VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_MGMTLSNR=SUBNET REGISTRATION_INVITED_NODES_LISTENER_SCAN2=() REGISTRATION_INVITED_NODES_LISTENER_SCAN3=()</pre> <p>Which enables SUBNET level valid node checking but given that no lists are provided does not provide any security.</p>
Action	Set <code>tcp.validnode_checking=YES</code> in <code>\$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora</code>



Built-in Packages

File System Access Risks (1:5)

- The Oracle database contains a number of built-in components that can be utilized to enable reading and writing to file systems
 - Secure data can be written
 - External files can be read
- Some have execute granted to PUBLIC and the public privileges should be revoked
- What you need to secure is
 - DBMS_ADVISOR
 - DBMS_LOB
 - DBMS_SQL
 - DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR
 - UTL_FILE

- Does this look like security by default?

```
SQL> SELECT DISTINCT grantee, table_name AS OBJECT_NAME, privilege
2 FROM cdb_tab_privs
3 WHERE table_name IN ('DBMS_ADVISOR',
                      'DBMS_LOB',
                      'DBMS_SCHEDULER',
                      'DBMS_SQL',
                      'DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR',
                      'UTL_FILE')
4 AND grantee = 'PUBLIC'
5* ORDER BY 2;
```

GRANTEE	OBJECT_NAME	PRIVILEGE
PUBLIC	DBMS_ADVISOR	EXECUTE
PUBLIC	DBMS_LOB	EXECUTE
PUBLIC	DBMS_SCHEDULER	EXECUTE
PUBLIC	DBMS_SQL	EXECUTE
PUBLIC	DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR	EXECUTE
PUBLIC	UTL_FILE	EXECUTE

File System Access Risks (2:5)

```
SQL> conn uwclass/uwclass@pdbdev
Connected.

SQL> CREATE TABLE uwclass.t (
  2  textcol CLOB);

Table created.

SQL>
SQL> DECLARE
  2  c CLOB;
  3  CURSOR scur IS
  4  SELECT text
  5  FROM dba_source
  6  WHERE rownum < 200001;
  7  BEGIN
  8  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'truncate table uwclass.t';
  9  FOR srec IN scur LOOP
 10  c := c || srec.text;
 11  END LOOP;
 12  INSERT INTO uwclass.t VALUES (c);
 13  COMMIT;
 14  END;
 15  /

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL> SELECT LENGTH(textcol) FROM uwclass.t;

LENGTH(TEXTCOL)
-----
8258936
```

```
SQL> set timing on
SQL> DECLARE
  2  buf CLOB;
  3  BEGIN
  4  SELECT textcol
  5  INTO buf
  6  FROM uwclass.t
  7  WHERE rownum = 1;
  8
  9  dbms_advisor.create_file(buf, 'CTEMP', 'testfile1.txt');
 10  END;
 11  /

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

Elapsed: 00:00:00.61
```

File System Access Risks (3:5)

The screenshot shows a Windows File Explorer window with the address bar set to 'C:\TEMP'. The left pane shows the navigation pane with 'TEMP' selected. The right pane displays a list of files and folders:

Name	Size	Date
JimC_Pres		11/20/2014 23:12 PM
txt		3/30/2013 21:33 PM
SQL		5/24/2012 6:55 AM
testfile1.txt	8,270 KB	4/19/2016 11:32 AM
usage_report.html	65 KB	11/7/2015 7:57 AM
demofile.txt		
BUCTRLFILE.TXT		
uw_oraprog.doc		
oow_notes.txt		
bryns_briefing.txt		
oaktableworld_notes.txt		
bgoug_dev_demos.txt		
Sothebys_estimate_form.pdf		
ars.html		
ipmitool.txt		
whiners.txt		
_FreeTime_bubbles.swf		
notes2.txt		

The Notepad window titled 'testfile1.txt - Notepad' displays the following PL/SQL code:

```
package STANDARD.AUTHID.CURRENT_USER is
edit occurs!

/***** Types and subtypes, do not reorder *****/
type BOOLEAN is (FALSE, TRUE);

type DATE is DATE_BASE;

type NUMBER is NUMBER_BASE;
subtype FLOAT is NUMBER; -- NUMBER(126)
subtype REAL is FLOAT; -- FLOAT(63)
subtype "DOUBLE PRECISION" is FLOAT;
subtype INTEGER is NUMBER(38,0);
subtype INT is INTEGER;
subtype SMALLINT is NUMBER(38,0);
subtype DECIMAL is NUMBER(38,0);
subtype NUMERIC is DECIMAL;
subtype DEC is DECIMAL;

subtype BINARY_INTEGER is INTEGER range '-2147483647'..2147483647;
subtype NATURAL is BINARY_INTEGER range 0..2147483647;
subtype NATURALN is NATURAL not null;
subtype POSITIVE is BINARY_INTEGER range 1..2147483647;
subtype POSITIVEN is POSITIVE not null;
subtype SIGNTYPE is BINARY_INTEGER range '-1'..1; -- for SIGN functions

type VARCHAR2 is NEW CHAR_BASE;

subtype VARCHAR is VARCHAR2;
subtype STRING is VARCHAR2;
```

■ EXTERNAL TABLES

- The CREATE TABLE privilege grants the privilege to create external tables
- Does this make you feel secure?
- Maybe you don't have a directory object pointing to \$ADR_HOME/trace but what directory objects exist in your database by default?

```
CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY bdump AS 'c:\app\oracle\diag\rdbms\orabase\orabase\trace\';

CREATE TABLE log_table (TEXT VARCHAR2(400))
ORGANIZATION EXTERNAL (
TYPE oracle_loader
DEFAULT DIRECTORY bdump
ACCESS PARAMETERS (
RECORDS DELIMITED BY NEWLINE
NOBADFILE NODISCARDFILE NOLOGFILE
FIELDS TERMINATED BY '0x0A'
MISSING FIELD VALUES ARE NULL)
LOCATION ('alert_orabase.log'))
REJECT LIMIT unlimited;

SELECT * FROM log_table;
```

Carefully monitor use of the CREATE ANY DIRECTORY privilege

File System Access Risks (5:5)

■ DBMS_SCHEDULER

- First available in version 10gR1 file watchers became available with version 11gR2
- A File Watcher is a program that watches for a file to be created

```
-- create job credential
exec dbms_scheduler.create_credential('uw_credential', 'uwclass', 'uwclass');

-- create program in disabled state
exec dbms_scheduler.create_program('file_watcher', 'stored_procedure', 'load_file', 1);

-- define program argument
exec dbms_scheduler.define_metadata_argument('file_watcher', 'EVENT_MESSAGE', 1);

-- enable program
exec dbms_scheduler.enable('file_watcher');

-- create file watcher
exec dbms_scheduler.create_file_watcher('UW_FWatch', 'STAGE', 'democlob.txt', 'uw_credential');
```

Network Access Risks (1:2)

- The Oracle database contains a number of built-in components that can be utilized to enable communications to the intranet and internet
- Configure access control lists with DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN and do not grant privileges to the following packages without strict controls
 - DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN
 - DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_UTILITY
 - UTL_HTTP
 - UTL_INADDR
 - UTL_MAIL
 - UTL_SMTP
 - UTL_TCP

- Does this look like security by default?

```
SQL> SELECT grantee, table_name
2 FROM cdb_tab_privs
3 WHERE table_name IN ('DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN',
                      'DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_UTILITY',
                      'UTL_HTTP',
                      'UTL_INADDR',
                      'UTL_MAIL',
                      'UTL_SMTP',
                      'UTL_TCP')

4 ORDER BY 2,1;
```

GRANTEE	TABLE_NAME
APEX_040200	UTL_HTTP
DBA	DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN
EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE	DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN
PUBLIC	DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_UTILITY
ORDPLUGINS	UTL_HTTP
PUBLIC	UTL_HTTP
ORACLE_OCM	UTL_INADDR
PUBLIC	UTL_INADDR
APEX_040200	UTL_SMTP
PUBLIC	UTL_SMTP
PUBLIC	UTL_TCP

Network Access Risks (2:2)

- **DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN**
 - Use to create Access Control Lists
- **DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_UTILITY**
 - Provides the utility functions that facilitate managing network access permissions
- **UTL_HTTP**
 - Has been used to capture websites and their content including code, images, and video
- **UTL_INADDR**
 - Can be used to interrogate DNS resources
- **UTL_MAIL**
 - Can be used to send data out of the database
- **UTL_SMTP**
 - Can be used to send data out of the database
- **UTL_TCP**
 - Supports application communications with external TCP/IP-based servers

```
SQL> SELECT DECODE(  
2     dbms_network_acl_admin.check_privilege('mlib-org-permissions.xml',  
3     'UWCLASS', 'connect'), 1, 'GRANTED', 0, 'DENIED', NULL) PRIVILEGE  
4 FROM DUAL;
```

```
dbms_network_acl_admin.check_privilege('mlib-org-permissions.xml',  
*  
ERROR at line 2:
```

```
ORA-46114: ACL name /sys/acls/mlib-org-permissions.xml not found.
```

```
SQL> BEGIN  
2     dbms_network_acl_admin.create_acl(acl => 'mlib-org-permissions.xml',  
3     description => 'Network permissions for *.morganslibrary.org',  
4     principal => 'UWCLASS', is_grant => TRUE, privilege => 'connect');  
5 END;  
6 /
```

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

```
SQL> SELECT DECODE(  
2     dbms_network_acl_admin.check_privilege('mlib-org-permissions.xml',  
3     'UWCLASS', 'connect'), 1, 'GRANTED', 0, 'DENIED', NULL) PRIVILEGE  
4 FROM DUAL;
```

```
PRIVILEGE  
-----  
GRANTED
```



```
SQL> SELECT utl_inaddr.get_host_name('10.241.1.71') FROM dual;  
      SELECT utl_inaddr.get_host_name('10.241.1.71') FROM dual  
            *  
ERROR at line 1:  
ORA-24247: network access denied by access control list (ACL)  
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 4  
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35  
ORA-06512: at line 1
```

UTL_HTTP

```
DECLARE
  req  utl_http.req;
  resp utl_http.resp;
  value VARCHAR2(1024);
BEGIN
  req := utl_http.begin_request('http://www.morganslibrary.org');
  utl_http.set_header(req, 'User-Agent', 'Mozilla/4.0');
  resp := utl_http.get_response(req);
  LOOP
    utl_http.read_line(resp, value, TRUE);
    dbms_output.put_line(value);
  END LOOP;
  utl_http.end_response(resp);
EXCEPTION
  WHEN utl_http.end_of_body THEN
    utl_http.end_response(resp);
END;
/
```



Other Built-In Packages

Database Link Communications (1:2)

- Database Links can be a valuable productivity tool
- They can also be an attack vector
- Regularly audit existing links and creation of new links

Explanation	Database links are objects that allow creation of an almost transparent connection between databases that can be used to select, insert, update, and/or delete data.																																																																
Validation	<pre>SELECT * FROM dba_db_links ORDER BY 1,2;</pre>																																																																
Finding	<table><thead><tr><th>OWNER</th><th>DB_LINK</th><th>USERNAME</th><th>HOST</th><th>CREATED</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>EPMPRD.???.EDU</td><td>SYSADM</td><td>EPMPRD</td><td>19-APR-12</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>FINPRD.???.EDU</td><td>SYSADM</td><td>FINPRD</td><td>10-NOV-11</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>HRRPT.???.EDU</td><td>SYSADM</td><td>HRRPT</td><td>10-NOV-11</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>HRTRN.???.EDU</td><td>SYSADM</td><td>HRTRN</td><td>10-NOV-11</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>OEPRD.???.EDU</td><td>PS_READ</td><td>oeprd</td><td>07-DEC-11</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>ODDWH.???.EDU</td><td>PS_READ</td><td>??DWH</td><td>10-NOV-11</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>OUPRD.???.EDU</td><td>PS_READ</td><td>??PRD</td><td>10-NOV-11</td></tr><tr><td>PUBLIC</td><td>PROD.???.EDU</td><td>PS_READ</td><td>PROD</td><td>10-NOV-11</td></tr><tr><td>SPOTLIGHT</td><td>QUEST_SOO_HRPRD1.???.EDU</td><td></td><td>hrprd1</td><td>02-DEC-11</td></tr><tr><td>SPOTLIGHT</td><td>QUEST_SOO_HRPRD2.???.EDU</td><td></td><td>hrprd2</td><td>02-DEC-11</td></tr><tr><td>SPOTLIGHT</td><td>QUEST_SOO_HRPRD3.???.EDU</td><td></td><td>hrprd3</td><td>02-DEC-11</td></tr></tbody></table>					OWNER	DB_LINK	USERNAME	HOST	CREATED	PUBLIC	EPMPRD.???.EDU	SYSADM	EPMPRD	19-APR-12	PUBLIC	FINPRD.???.EDU	SYSADM	FINPRD	10-NOV-11	PUBLIC	HRRPT.???.EDU	SYSADM	HRRPT	10-NOV-11	PUBLIC	HRTRN.???.EDU	SYSADM	HRTRN	10-NOV-11	PUBLIC	OEPRD.???.EDU	PS_READ	oeprd	07-DEC-11	PUBLIC	ODDWH.???.EDU	PS_READ	??DWH	10-NOV-11	PUBLIC	OUPRD.???.EDU	PS_READ	??PRD	10-NOV-11	PUBLIC	PROD.???.EDU	PS_READ	PROD	10-NOV-11	SPOTLIGHT	QUEST_SOO_HRPRD1.???.EDU		hrprd1	02-DEC-11	SPOTLIGHT	QUEST_SOO_HRPRD2.???.EDU		hrprd2	02-DEC-11	SPOTLIGHT	QUEST_SOO_HRPRD3.???.EDU		hrprd3	02-DEC-11
OWNER	DB_LINK	USERNAME	HOST	CREATED																																																													
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SPOTLIGHT	QUEST_SOO_HRPRD3.???.EDU		hrprd3	02-DEC-11																																																													

Database Link Communications (2:2)

- **DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN**
 - First released with in 2001, contains procedures to maintain the Trusted Servers List
 - Use the package to define whether a server is trusted. If a database is not trusted, Oracle refuses current user database links from the database
 - Cannot stop PDB to PDB links in the same CDB

```
SQL> exec dbms_distributed_trust_admin.deny_all;

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL> SELECT * FROM ku$_trlink_view;

V V NAME          FUNCTION                                TYPE
-- --
1 0 -*           DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN.DENY_ALL    0

SQL> exec dbms_distributed_trust_admin.allow_server('BIGDOG.MLIB.ORG');

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL> SELECT * FROM ku$_trlink_view;

V V NAME          FUNCTION                                TYPE
-- --
1 0 -*           DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN.DENY_ALL    0
1 0 BIGDOG.MLIB.ORG DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN.ALLOW_SERVER 1
```



SQL Injection

SQL Injection

- 25% of all attacks are by SQL Injection ... and 89% of all data stolen is the result of a SQL Injection attack
- If you do not know how to attack your databases ... you cannot prevent an attack?
- To prevent SQL Injection attacks
 - Use Bind Variables
 - Use DBMS_ASSERT

```
SQL> SELECT dbms_assert.sql_object_name('UWCLASS.SERVERS')
       2 FROM dual;
```

```
DBMS_ASSERT.SQL_OBJECT_NAME('UWCLASS.SERVERS')
```

```
-----  
UWCLASS.SERVERS
```

```
SQL> SELECT dbms_assert.sql_object_name('UWCLASS.SERVERZ')
       2 FROM dual;
```

```
SELECT dbms_assert.sql_object_name('UWCLASS.SERVERZ')
```

```
*
```

```
ERROR at line 1:
```

```
ORA-44002: invalid object name
```

```
ORA-06512: at "SYS.DBMS_ASSERT", line 383
```



Miscellaneous Topics

As If It Was Required That I Further Emphasize The Point

```
SQL*Plus: Release 11.2.0.1.0 Production on Thu Aug 24 13:56:10 2017
Copyright (c) 1982, 2010, Oracle. All rights reserved.
Enter user-name: WFHMDW30
Enter password:
ERROR:
ORA-12560: TNS:protocol adapter error

Enter user-name: _
```

This is from one of the largest commercial banks in the US
One that people in this room do business with



Recyclebin

- Tables contain data and when tables are dropped, unless the PURGE keyword is used, the table and its indexes remain queryable and recoverable in the recyclebin
- Always drop table with PURGE
`drop table <table_name> PURGE;`

```
SQL> CREATE TABLE dropme (soc_sec_no VARCHAR2(11));

SQL> INSERT INTO dropme (soc_sec_no)
  2  VALUES ('523-14-0963');

SQL> COMMIT;

SQL> DROP TABLE dropme;

SQL> SELECT object_name, original_name, type, related, base_object
  2  FROM user_recyclebin;

SQL> SELECT * FROM "BIN$eVwc/lghQwq9QkrmYD1vRg==$0";

SQL> FLASHBACK TABLE dropme TO BEFORE DROP;

SQL> desc dropme

SQL> SELECT * FROM dropme;
```

Security in the Oracle Cloud



Oracle 18c in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (1:2)

- The OCI Cloud may not be available to you ... but many of its security features are and can be quickly adopted
- Here is Oracle's SQLNET.ORA

```
[oracle@db18c-ee-hp admin]$ more sqlnet.ora
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER = required

SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER = (SHA1)

SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER = required

ENCRYPTION_WALLET_LOCATION =
(SOURCE=(METHOD=FILE) (METHOD_DATA=(DIRECTORY=/u01/app/oracle/admin/orcl/tde_wallet)))

SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER = (AES256, AES192, AES128)

NAMES.DIRECTORY_PATH = (TNSNAMES, EZCONNECT)

SQLNET.WALLET_OVERRIDE = FALSE

SQLNET.EXPIRE_TIME = 10

SSL_VERSION = 1.2

WALLET_LOCATION = (SOURCE=(METHOD=FILE) (METHOD_DATA=(DIRECTORY=/u01/app/oracle/admin/orcl/db_wallet)))
```

Oracle 18c in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (2:2)

- The OCI Cloud may not be available to you ... but many of its security features are and can be quickly adopted
- Here is Oracle's LISTENER.ORA

```
[oracle@db18c-ee-hp admin]$ more listener.ora
# listener.ora Network Configuration File: /u01/app/oracle/product/18.0.0/dbhome_1/network/admin/listener.ora
# Generated by Oracle configuration tools.

LISTENER =
  (DESCRIPTION_LIST =
    (DESCRIPTION =
      (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP) (HOST = db18c-ee-hp.compute-a430291.oraclecloud.internal) (PORT = 1521))
      (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = IPC) (KEY = EXTPROC1521))
    )
  )

VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_LISTENER=ON
SSL_VERSION = 1.2
```

OEM and OMC

- The OEM development team has been split in half with one half continuing to work on OEM and the other half building the Oracle Management Cloud (OMC) and migrating functionality to OMC
- What will remain in OEM is basic functionality such as starting and stopping
- Monitoring activities are moving to OMC
- OMC will be available on-premise and in the cloud

Name	Description
Application Performance Monitoring	Diagnostic & Tuning Pack
Infrastructure Monitoring	Single Pane-of-Glass
Log Analytics	Splunk Killer
IT Analytics	Splunk Killer
Configuration & Compliance	Governance
Security Monitoring & Analytics	Security Warnings & Alerts
Orchestration	Process Automation
Dashboards	Business Intelligence
Explorers	Business Intelligence



Oracle Management Cloud

The screenshot displays the Oracle Management Cloud interface. On the left is a dark sidebar menu with the following items: Management Cloud, Home, Alerts, Dashboards, Data Explorer, APM, Monitoring, Log Analytics, IT Analytics, Orchestration, Security Analytics, Compliance, and Administration. The main area contains a grid of nine service tiles, each with a colored background, an icon, a title, and a brief description. The 'Security Monitoring and Analytics' tile is highlighted with a red border.

Service	Icon Description	Description
Application Performance Monitoring	Cloud with speedometer	Rapidly identify, response, and resolve your software roadblocks
Infrastructure Monitoring	Cloud with server and graph	Monitor your entire IT infrastructure - on-premise or on the cloud - from one unified platform
Log Analytics	Cloud with magnifying glass and bar chart	Topology aware log exploration and analytics for modern applications and infrastructure
IT Analytics	Cloud with server and pie chart	Operational big data intelligence for modern IT
Configuration and Compliance	Cloud with checklist	Automate application and infrastructure configuration assessments
Security Monitoring and Analytics	Cloud with shield and padlock	Detect, investigate and mitigate security threats
Orchestration	Cloud with gear and code symbols	Schedule, execute and report on tasks at scale
Dashboards	Bar chart	Build custom dashboards using out-of-the-box widgets or your own visualization of data
Explorers	Magnifying glass	Search, analyze, and visualize data

iPad 1:04 PM 32%

trial.palerra.net

ORACLE CASB Cloud Service

Dashboard: Summary

Summary | App Discovery | Key Security Indicators

Dashboard

Applications

Risk Events

Reports

Users

Incidents

Jobs

Add App Instance

amazon web services Acme_AWS

box Acme_Box

Office 365 Acme-O365

salesforce Acme_SFDC

servicenow Acme_Snow

Health Summary

Issues for Acme_AWS

32	1	1
Security Controls	Incidents	Threats

5 Policy Alerts

Data processed in the last 90 days

4 MB	24363	13
Data Size	Records	IP Addresses

4756 normal, 13 suspicious events. Filter

Suspicious and normal IP addresses

User risk levels

Users with the most f

IP addresses that accessed your apps

Determined by anomalous or suspicious activity

mary.baker@acmeloric.



iPad 1:27 PM trial.palerra.net 24%

Threats for: SFDC | Instance: Acme_SFDC

Time Range: Last 4 weeks Show All

Issue Count

Trending per day

- Unique Login IPs
- Unique Browsers
- Failed Login Geographical Locations
- Reports Run
- Actions in Password Policy
- Unique Failed Login IPs
- Login Geographical Locations
- Unique OSs
- Network Prefix
- Login Actions
- Unique IP addresses
- Failed Logins
- Manage User Profile actions
- Unique Geographical Locations
- Actions in Manage User Role
- Actions in Mass Record Transfers
- Actions in Sharing Groups
- Actions in Data Export
- Actions in Mass Record Deletes
- Actions in Shared Settings
- Actions in Manage Users

2 Unique Login IPs
SFDC:Acme SFDC


Event Date: Jan 27, 2017 UTC

[View incident](#) [Dismiss](#) [Close](#)

Actor: mary.baker@acmeloric.com **Action:** Possible account hijack attempt
Occurred: Feb 09, 2017 22:23:02 UTC

Configuration	Threat	Activity	Date	Status	ID	Action
<input type="checkbox"/>	⚠ User behavior risk for mary.baker@acmeloric.com	Anomalous activity	Feb 09, 2017 22:21:27 UTC	Open	96963000065	View threat
<input type="checkbox"/>	⚠ Brute force attack risk for mary.baker@acmeloric.com	Anomalous activity	Feb 07, 2017 05:57:19 UTC	Open	96963000020	Action
<input type="checkbox"/>	⚠ User behavior risk for mary.baker@acmeloric.com	Anomalous activity	Feb 07, 2017 05:56:11 UTC	Open	96963000019	Action





Wrap Up

Both Of These Train Wrecks Were Avoidable

```
DIR=/opt/oracle/scripts
. /home/oracle/.profile_db

DB_NAME=hrrpt
ORACLE_SID=$DB_NAME"1"
export ORACLE_SID

SPFILE=`more $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init$ORACLE_SID.ora | grep -i spfile`
PFILE=$ORACLE_BASE/admin/$DB_NAME/pfile/init$ORACLE_SID.ora
LOG=$DIR/refresh_$DB_NAME.log
RMAN_LOG=$DIR/refresh_$DB_NAME"_rman".log

PRD_PWD=sys_pspr0d
PRD_SID=hrrpd1
PRD_R_UNAME=rman_pshrprd
PRD_R_PWD=pspr0d11
PRD_BK=/backup/hrrprd/rman_bk
SEQUENCE=`grep "input archive log thread" $PRD_BK/bk.log | tail -1 | awk '{ print $5 }'`
THREAD=`grep "input archive log thread" $PRD_BK/bk.log | tail -1 | awk '{ print $4 }'`

BK_DIR=/backup/$DB_NAME/rman_bk
EXPDIR=/backup/$DB_NAME/exp
DMPFILE=$EXPDIR/exp_sec.dmp
IMPLOG=$EXPDIR/imp_sec.log
EXPLOG=$EXPDIR/exp_sec.log
EXP_PARFILE=$DIR/exp_rpt.par
IMP_PARFILE=$DIR/imp_rpt.par

uname=rman_pshrprd
pwd=pspr0d11

rman target sys/$PRD_PWD@$PRD_SID catalog $PRD_R_UNAME/$PRD_R_PWD@catdb auxiliary / << EOF > $RMAN_LOG
run{
  set until $SEQUENCE $THREAD;
  ALLOCATE AUXILIARY CHANNEL aux2 DEVICE TYPE DISK;
  duplicate target database to $DB_NAME;
}
EOF
```



Conclusions (1:2)

- Securing the Perimeter has proven that its primary value is to companies selling products that claim to secure the perimeter
- Auditing is not security
- Passing audits is not security and provides a false sense of security
- What is wrong with the way our industry views security is that we must secure data as well as software
 - Oracle is generic software
 - We build our own database structure/layout/design
 - We build our own applications (APEX, JAVA, JavaScript, C#, Python, C++, PHP, Ruby)
 - We must also build our own security
 - Security is not done well or forgotten in the rush implement features and performance
 - We must assume break-ins will take place
- To begin securing data we must utilize the Oracle Database's built-in features
- To fully secure data we must enable built-in features and we must invest real effort ... not just throw money at the problem

Conclusions (2:2)

- It is difficult to dig yourself out of a hole after the sides have fallen in
- Very few organizations have employees with the skill set required to secure their databases and operational environments: Less than 1% of DBA "training" involves security
- If you don't have the internal skills to know what to protect and how to protect it you need to go outside your organization and ask for help



Included In Your Existing Licenses - Have You Enabled Them?


- Network Encryption - SQLNET.ORA
- Valid Node Checking - SQLNET.ORA
- Password Verify Function - utlpwdmg.sql
- Network Access Control List - DBMS_NETWORK_ACL_ADMIN
- Database Link Management - DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN
- Create your own secure profiles and assign no one to DEFAULT
- Create your own internal roles with only privileges required to do the job
 - Verify no one has CONNECT, RESOURCE, or DBA roles
- Perform all backups as SYSBACKUP
- Perform all Data Guard management as SYSDG
- Perform all Key management as SYSKM
- Replace all human-use connections with Proxy Users

*

ERROR at line 1:

ORA-00028: your session has been killed

Thank you



Appendix A: Important Terms

- **Attack Surface**
 - Any node on the network that can be attacked. It can be the UI, People, anything or anybody that accesses data
- **Exploit**
 - Take advantage of a flaw or feature
- **Hack**
 - Anything that can be hacked. Do something it was not intended to do or something you did not think it could do
- **Leak**
 - Sensitive data has spilled outside of it's protected environment. It has been compromised.
- **Spillage**
 - Sensitive data has "spilled" outside it's protected environment. It may not have been compromised